No, that's someone|else's business.
Quagmire's the--|I don't do quagmires.
As I looked at the dictionary,
I'm not uncomfortable|with "unconventional,"
because it is not an army,|and it is not a Navy,
and it is not an air force.
But even there,|the dictionary--
the Pentagon dictionary--
I haven't looked|in a regular dictionary.
The Pentagon dictionary does not|even land that one perfectly
on what's taking place.
The bush administration has been
on a stepped-up P.R. Campaign
to stop the erosion|of support at home
for the dangerous mission|in Iraq.
Today, an unprecedented|series of bombings
left a trail|of death and devastation.
The concern|that Iraq's reconstruction is,
in fact, falling well short|of expectations.
Today in Fallujah,|Iraqi guerrillas
used a roadside bomb to bring|an American patrol to--
Briggs accused the Rumsfeld|team of being under-prepared
for post-war conditions|on the ground and unwilling
to share decision-making|with other government agencies.
Acknowledgement|that long-simmering tensions
over Iraq and its aftermath,|particularly between
the departments of state|and defense,
have now reached full boil.
October of 2003.
I became worried|that we were having trouble
measuring progress,
and I wrote a memo called|"global war on terror."
"Are we winning or losing|the global war on terror?
Is D.O.D. Changing|fast enough to deal
with the new 21st-century|security environment?
Are the changes we have|and are making too modest
and incremental?
My impression is that|we have not yet
made truly bold moves,
although we have made many|sensible, logical moves
in the right direction."
"But are they enough," I asked.
"Today we lack metrics to know
if we are winning or losing|the global war on terror.
Are we killing or deterring|more terrorists every day
than the madrassas|and the radical clerics
are recruiting and deploying|against us?
It's pretty clear|that the coalition can win
in Afghanistan and Iraq
in one way or another,
but it will be|a long, hard slog."
It was Christmastime.
I can recall going up|to the secure phone closet.
It's in the second floor|of our house,
not too far from my bedroom.
What was in there|was a noise system
that sounded like an ocean wave.
They had scooped up some people,
low-level people,
who might have some reason|to know where he might be.
He'd been moving|around the country every day,
sleeping a different place,
moving around in taxicabs.
Also moving around|were some body doubles,
people who looked|exactly like Saddam Hussein,
indeed, had the same|distinguishing marks
on their bodies.
Some low-level individual|said that he believed
he knew where|Saddam Hussein was.
They inspected this farm|out in the middle of nowhere.
There was a trapdoor.
They opened this up.
Lo and behold, here was|this bedraggled, bearded man
down in that hole.
Saddam Hussein clearly|concluded it was all a bluff.
The United States|was a paper tiger.
They weren't gonna do anything.
The first Gulf war|left him feeling
that no one|was gonna bother him.
He was the person who prevailed.
He obviously felt|that he was a survivor.
And he was, for a while.
Someone said, "do you want|to go see Saddam Hussein,"
after he was captured.
And I said,|"no."
I said, "I would like|to talk to Tariq Aziz."
It's a complicated situation|for me.
As the number two man,
simultaneously|deputy prime minister
and foreign minister|for Saddam Hussein,
and you meet with him,|you come away
with that he is a perfectly|rational, logical individual.
I've spent hours and hours|with him.
You wonder what goes on|in a mind like that.
I would love to talk|to Tariq Aziz and figure out
what in the world|they were thinking.
What else might|the United States have done
to reach out to them
and get them|to behave rationally.
On February 6, 2003,
to Jim Haynes.
"Subject: Detainees.
I am concerned|that the detainee issues
we were wrestling with|have not been resolved.
And as far as I can see...
...it has just|dropped into a black pit.
We have to get it figured out.|Thanks."
"January 10, 2003.
Subject: Detainees.
I have simply got to know
when you folks|are going to be prepared
to brief the White House|on detainees.
In fact, I don't think|I'll even do it that way.
Instead, let me just say,|you should be prepared
to brief the White House..."
"Subject: The N.S.C."
"Or the principals committee|on detainees,
including the most recent|issue that has been raised,
no later than next Tuesday."
"January 14.
I want to get briefed|on the Iraqi detainees fast.
I'm really worried about it.
Thanks."
When the pictures came,
it had an impact|that was well beyond
anything that I'd experienced.
Why do you think|the pictures did it?
What it showed was people|engaging in acts of abuse
that were disgusting|and revolting.
There were pictures|showing that prison guards
in the midnight shift
were doing things to prisoners|that didn't kill them,
that didn't create injuries|that were permanent,
but they were engaging|in sadistic things,
and there was nudity involved.
I knew that it would create|a advantage for the terrorists,
for Al-Qaeda and for the people|in the insurgency,
who were out recruiting.
They could show|that the Americans
were treating people badly.
It worked against everything|we were trying to do.
I walked in|and said to the president,
"I'm the senior person,|and I believe in accountability.
Here's my resignation."
It was in my handwriting.
I didn't want to dictate it
or have it typed up by somebody.
I felt a very strong sense
that something terrible|had happened on my watch.
He said, "don, I recognize|how you feel about this,
but that's not gonna|solve the problem."
I testified before the house,|testified before the senate,
tried to figure out|how everything happened.
When a ship runs aground,
the captain of the ship's|generally relieved.
You don't relieve|your presidents,
and I couldn't find anyone|that I thought
it would be fair and responsible|to pin the tail on.
So I sat down and wrote|a second letter of resignation,
and I still believe to this day
that I was correct|and it would have been better,
better for the administration|and the department of defense
and better for me,
if the department|could have started fresh
with someone else|in the leadership position.
So you wish|it had been accepted?
Yes.
There's a claim|that the interrogation rules
used in Guantanamo
migrated to Iraq,
where they led|to incredible abuse.
The evidence is to the contrary.
There were 12 investigations
that looked at these issues,
some by civilians,
distinguished people like|Dr. Harold brown
and Dr. James Schlesinger,|former secretaries of defense,
others by military officials.
To suggest that|the procedures from Guantanamo
migrated over to Iraq
is to suggest that|the procedures in Guantanamo
would have encouraged the kind
of unbelievably bad, illegal,|improper behavior
that took place at Abu Ghraib,
and there's nothing|that would have permitted
anything like that.
Anyone who reads|the investigative reports
knows that's not the case.
This is from|the Schlesinger report.
"Changes in D.O.D.|Interrogation policies
between December 2, 2002,|and April 16, 2003,
were an element contributing|to uncertainties in the field
as to which techniques|were authorized.
Although specifically limited|by the secretary of defense
to Guantanamo, and requiring|his personal approval,
given in only two cases,
the augmented techniques|for Guantanamo
migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq
where they were neither limited|nor safeguarded."
Mm-hmm.
Yeah, I think|that's a fair assessment.
Mm-hmm.
Are you saying|stuff just happens?
Well, we know that
in every war|there are things that evolve
that hadn't been planned for|or fully anticipated
and that things occur|which shouldn't occur.
Wouldn't it have been|better not to go there at all?
Well, I guess time will tell.
Barack Obama opposed|most of the structures
that president George W. Bush|put in place:
Guantanamo bay, the concept|of indefinite detention,
the patriot act,|military commissions.
Here we are, years later,
and they're all still there.
I think that kind of has to|validate, to some extent,
the decisions that were made|by president George W. Bush.
We went to Bethesda|and Walter Reed
a great many times.
The strength that you felt|from the families
and the people wounded
was just absolutely|an inspiration.
It was an intensive care unit.
The doctor said,|"this guy's not gonna make it."
We walked in, met the man,|talked to him,
talked to the family.
I don't know what the word is.
But the family--|the wife said,
"I know he'll make it."
I think it was probably|two, three, four weeks later
I went back, and sure as heck,
the doctor said he made it.
Unbelievable.
So we're|a very fortunate country,
and the good lord willing,
we won't have|to be engaged in wars,
but I'm afraid,|human nature being what it is,
that we'll have to continue|to ask young men and women
to come and serve our country,
and their lives will be at risk.
When you're in a position|like secretary of defense,
do you feel that you actually|are in control of history
or that history|is controlling you?
Oh, neither.
Obviously,|you don't control history,
and you are failing|if history controls you.
Are you surprised|when you go back
and read these memos?
Oh, my goodness, yes.
I can't believe|some of the things I wrote.
I don't know where|all those words came from.
"February 4, 2004.
Subject: What you know.
There are knowns knowns.
There are known unknowns.
There are unknown unknowns.
But there are also|unknown knowns.
That is to say,|things that you think you know
that it turns out|you did not."
If you take those words
and try to connect them|in each way that is possible...
There was at least|one more combination
that wasn't there:
The unknown knowns.
Things that|you possibly may know
that you don't know you know.
But the memo doesn't say that.
It says we know less,|not more, than we think we do.
Is that right?|I reversed it?
Put it up again.|Let me see.
"There are also unknown knowns.
That is to say,|things that you think you know
that it turns out you did not."
Yeah, I think that memo|is backwards.
I think that it's closer|to what I said here than that.
Unknown knowns.
I think you're probably, Errol,|chasing the wrong rabbit here.
As ubiquitous|as those suicide bombers
have become in Iraq, far more|people are now being killed
by executions|than by those bombings.
Another 40 bodies today dumped
on the streets of Baghdad,|tortured.
But with|an especially deadly October
and Iraq tipping toward chaos--
the U.S. is on|the brink of failure in Iraq.
A parade of generals called|Rumsfeld’s war strategy flawed.
The democrats are in;|Donald Rumsfeld is out.
Firing secretary of|defense Donald Rumsfeld
and replacing him with a veteran|of his father's administration.
Mr. President,|thank you for your kind words.
The great respect that I have|for your leadership
in this little-understood,|unfamiliar war,
the first war|of the 21st century.
It is not well known.
It was not well understood.
It is complex for people|to comprehend.
And I know with certainty|that, over time,
the contributions you've made|will be recorded by history.
Thank you.
Mr. secretary.
This way.
"December 15, 2006.
To: Pentagon personnel.
From: Donald Rumsfeld.
Subject: 'Snowflakes--
the blizzard is over.'
over the past six years,
thousands of these memos|have fallen,
sometimes in blizzards,
and sometimes in cold|and lonely isolation.
Yet, as surprising|as this may seem
to those who may have been|buried in the deluge,
there are many people|in the department
who have never received|a snowflake.
This snowflake|is especially for them.
Its message is, perhaps|typically, to the point.
Thank you.
The blizzard is over."
One last question.
Why are you doing this?
Why are you talking to me?
That is a vicious question.
I'll be darned if I know.
THE END
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