Is he being treated|like the other detainees,
shackled, hooded,|and what have you?
Oh, well,|let me say this about that.
When people are moved,|they are restrained.
That is true in prisons|across the globe.
Will any single prisoner|be treated humanely?
You bet.
When they are being moved|from place to place,
will they be restrained in a way
so that they are less likely|to be able to
kill an American soldier?
You bet.
Is it inhumane|to do that? No.
Would it be stupid|to do anything else?
Yes.
Mr. secretary--
what about all these|so-called "torture memos?"
Well, there were, what,|one or two or three.
I don't know the number,|but there were not
"all" of these|so-called memos.
They were mischaracterized|as torture memos,
and they came, not out of|the bush administration per se,
but they came out of|the U.S. department of justice,
blessed by the Attorney General,
the senior legal official|of the United States of America,
having been nominated|by a president and confirmed
by the United States senate|overwhelmingly.
Little different cast|I just put on it
than the one you did.
I'll chalk that one up.
Was the reaction unfair?
Well, I've never read them.
- Really?|- No.
I'm not a lawyer.|What would I know?
I've never seen so much|misinformation communicated
about a place than was the case|about Guantanamo bay, Cuba.
This prison was|exceedingly well-run,
yet the impression that's left
is that it was a terrible place,
and people were tortured,|and people were abused.
Prisons aren't pretty places,
but that prison|is probably as well-run
as any prison|on the face of the earth.
If you go and ask somebody|in a big audience,
"how many people do you think|were waterboarded
at Guantanamo?"
And people stick their hands up,|and someone will say,
"well, hundreds."
The answer is,|"nobody."
Zero were waterboarded|at Guantanamo.
The military|never waterboarded anybody
in an interrogation.
The CIA waterboarded,|as I understand it,
three people.
But it wasn't at Guantanamo,|and it wasn't done
by the United States|department of defense.
Al Qahtani|was never waterboarded?
No.
Now, were there some things done
that shouldn't have been done|at Guantanamo?
You bet.
When someone looked|like they were
a very high-value detainee,
the department of defense|didn't deal with them.
The central intelligence agency|did, and properly so.
In the case of Qahtani,
he was a high-value detainee,
and for some reason,|he wasn't transferred.
Someone junior|in the chain of command
decided that he was probably|the 20th hijacker.
General hill wrote a memo.
"There are three categories|of interrogation techniques
that we would like you|to consider for approval."
How unusual were|these techniques?
Oh, they ran the gamut.
One of the techniques|recommended was waterboarding,
which I rejected.
Others would be,|"yelling at the detainee,
techniques of deception,
where you'd use|multiple interrogator--
interviewer may identify himself
as a citizen of a foreign--
with a reputation|for harsh treatment--
category II techniques--
stress positions, like standing,
for a maximum of four hours.
Falsified documents|or reports--
the use of isolation|facility for up to 30 days.
Deprivation of light|and auditory stimuli.
Hood placed over his head
during transportation|and questioning.
20 hour interrogations.
Removal of all comfort items,|including religious items.
Removal of clothing. Forced|grooming, shaving of facial hair.
Detainee individual phobias,|such fear of dogs,
to induce stress.
Category III techniques.|Use of non--
physical contact such as|grabbing and light pushing."
I think that's all.
Good grief,|that's a pile of stuff.
Jim Haynes, the general counsel,
sent it to me with a cover memo.
"I recommend that you approve|most of the things
in category I, if not all,
most of the things|in category II, if not all,
and one or two or three|of the things in category III.
But disapprove the others."
I remember one of the things|required that
he'd stand for three or four,|five, six hours.
When I approved it,|I wrote down that, you know,
I stand for eight or ten|hours a day.
I forget what I said,|but something like that.
Needless to say,|I did not intend
that my memo would then be sent|back down the chain of command.
In the case of Qahtani,
some of the things|that were done to him
were not approved.
And the interrogation plan
involving the duration|and the combination
of the techniques|was not proper.
Up came a concern expressed|to the general counsel.
"We hear some of these things|are being done to this fellow
that aren't approved|or aren't proper
in the interrogation plan."
And he came in and told me,
and I immediately|rescinded that memo.
Some weeks later, we reissued
the enhanced|interrogation techniques.
There was criticism|from some of the military people
in the chain|that by suspending them
for a period of weeks,
we were putting at risk|the American people.
How do you know|when you're going too far?
You can't know with certainty.
All the easy decisions|are made down below.
When you say,|"how can you know?"
The answer is,|"you can't."
Wouldn't it be wonderful|if we could see around corners,
have our imaginations anticipate
every conceivable thing|that could happen and then,
from that full array|and spectrum,
pick out the ones|that will happen?
Is there any|evidence to indicate
that Iraq has attempted to|or is willing to supply
terrorists with weapons|of mass destruction?
As we know,|there are known knowns.
There are things|we know we know.
We also know|there are known unknowns.
That is to say,|we know there's some things
we do not know.
But there are also|unknown unknowns,
the ones we don't know|we don't know.
We just want to know,|are you aware of any evidence,
because that would increase|our level of belief
from faith to something|that would be...
- Yeah...|- Based on evidence.
"Subject: To discuss with P.,"
meaning the president|of the United States.
"The absence of evidence
is not evidence of absence."
When you say,|"the absence of evidence
is not evidence of absence,"|what you're saying
is that there is an absence|of evidence about something,
but you ought not to say|that therefore that is proof
that something doesn't exist.
It's an easy thing to go|from the first part of that
in the wrong direction and say,
"well, the absence of evidence|means it isn't there."
If an inspection team|goes in now
and finds nothing because
perhaps Iraq is very good|at hiding it
or perhaps they have nothing--
but you all are of the belief|that they have it--
if they find nothing, does it|make your job more difficult
in trying to assemble|an international coalition
to disarm him by other means?
Goodness gracious,|that is kind of like
looking down the road|for every conceivable pothole
you can find|and then driving into it.
I just don't--|I don't get up in the morning
and ask myself that.
The--
we know they have|weapons of mass destruction.
We know|they have active programs.
There isn't any debate about it.
It was thought to be|the best intelligence available.
How do you describe it
when it turns out|to be not accurate?
Do you describe that|as a failure of intelligence?
I suppose some can,|not unfairly, suggest that.
Saddam Hussein|may have been fearful
that he would be discovered|as having those weapons,
removed them or destroyed them,
but not wanted to tell anybody|that he'd done so.
He may have destroyed them,
unwilling to admit it,
fearful of being seen as weak.
Wouldn't it be strange|if he had destroyed his W.M.D.
And got invaded anyway?
Of course, I'm not suggesting|that that's the case.
I honestly do not know|what the case is.
All I know is that|the intelligence community
persuaded the president|and secretary Powell.
He spent days preparing himself|to make his presentation
to the united nations.
And he spent years|trying to explain
why he had done it.
It's a short sentence.
The reason he presented it|was 'cause he believed it.
"October 15, 2001.
Subject: Definition.
Please give me|a good definition for terrorism
and some elaboration as to|what it is and what it isn't."
"December 28, 2001.
Subject:|Adopting common terminology.
I suggest we use|the following terms.
'Afghan Taliban':
Afghan officials and fighters|of the former regime."
"October 31, 2002.
Subject:|Definition of victory.
Where is that definition|of victory?"
"January 6, 2003.
Subject: Terminology.
I want to make a list of things
I've done at the Pentagon,
like getting rid of words.
National missile defense,|requirements,
readiness--|ready for what?"
"October 1, 2003.
Subject: Please get me the|Oxford dictionary definition
of 'several'|and type it up for me.
Thanks."
"May 14, 2004.
Definition.
Please give me|the dictionary definition
of 'scapegoat.'
thanks."
And where did this term|"shock and awe" come from?
I don't know.
Apparently, general Franks|read it.
He used it.
It became|part of a press discussion.
But the idea of shock and awe?
I've told you all I know|about that phrase.
I picked up a newspaper today,
and I couldn't believe it.
I read eight headlines|that talked about chaos,
violence, unrest.
And it just was, "Henny Penny,
the sky is falling."
I've never seen|anything like it.
And here is a country|that's being liberated.
Here are people|who are going from being
repressed|and held under the thumb
of a vicious dictator,|and they're free,
and all this newspaper could do,
with 8 or 10 headlines--
they showed a man bleeding,
a civilian who they claimed|we had shot.
One thing after another,|it's just unbelievable
how people can take that away
from what is happening|in that country.
Stuff happens.
But in terms of what's going on|in that country,
it is a fundamental|misunderstanding
to see those images|over and over and over again
of some boy walking out|with a vase,
and saying, "oh, my goodness.
You didn't have a plan."
That's nonsense.
They know what they're doing,
and they're doing|a terrific job.
And it's untidy,|and freedom's untidy,
and free people|are free to make mistakes
and commit crimes|and do bad things.
They're also free|to live their lives
and do wonderful things.
And that's|what's gonna happen here.
Mr. secretary--
this was another violent|day in the streets of Baghdad.
One of Washington's|nightmares came true today.
The bush administration|is admitting it wasn't fully
prepared for the huge task|of governing post-war Iraq.
Now troops patrol these|streets knowing that to many,
they are not liberators,|but occupiers.
It's a situation|the Pentagon admits
it failed to anticipate.
The Pentagon is|scoffing at suggestions
that an organized guerrilla|resistance is forming.
"July 23, 2003."
To general John Abizaid.
"Subject: Definitions.
Attached are the definitions|of 'guerilla warfare,'
'insurgency,'|and 'unconventional warfare.'
they came from|the Pentagon dictionary.
Thanks."
It seemed to me|that there are ways
you can talk about|what the enemy's doing
that help the enemy|unintentionally
and ways you can talk about|what the enemy's doing
that harm the enemy,
that make his task|less legitimate,
more difficult.
What you're seeing is
Rumsfeld floundering around,|trying to figure out,
what do all those words mean?
What do other people think|they mean?
What are the best ones to use
that will benefit|the United States of America?
One of you suggested|I go to the dictionary.
I didn't ask this question.
Yes, but he would have.
I have since gone|to the dictionary,
and I have looked up|several things,
one of which I can't|immediately recapture,
but one was "guerrilla war."
Another was "insurgency."
Another was|"unconventional war."
Pardon me?
"Quagmire"?
No, that's someone|else's business.
Quagmire's the--|I don't do quagmires.
As I looked at the dictionary,
I'm not uncomfortable|with "unconventional,"
because it is not an army,|and it is not a Navy,
and it is not an air force.
But even there,|the dictionary--
the Pentagon dictionary--
I haven't looked|in a regular dictionary.
The Pentagon dictionary does not|even land that one perfectly
on what's taking place.
The bush administration has been
on a stepped-up P.R. Campaign
to stop the erosion|of support at home
for the dangerous mission|in Iraq.
Today, an unprecedented|series of bombings
left a trail|of death and devastation.
The concern|that Iraq's reconstruction is,
in fact, falling well short|of expectations.
Today in Fallujah,|Iraqi guerrillas
used a roadside bomb to bring|an American patrol to--
Briggs accused the Rumsfeld|team of being under-prepared
for post-war conditions|on the ground and unwilling
to share decision-making|with other government agencies.
Acknowledgement|that long-simmering tensions
over Iraq and its aftermath,|particularly between
the departments of state|and defense,
have now reached full boil.
October of 2003.
I became worried|that we were having trouble
measuring progress,
and I wrote a memo called|"global war on terror."
"Are we winning or losing|the global war on terror?
Is D.O.D. Changing|fast enough to deal
with the new 21st-century|security environment?
Are the changes we have|and are making too modest
and incremental?
My impression is that|we have not yet
made truly bold moves,
although we have made many|sensible, logical moves
in the right direction."
"But are they enough," I asked.
"Today we lack metrics to know
if we are winning or losing|the global war on terror.
Are we killing or deterring|more terrorists every day
than the madrassas|and the radical clerics
are recruiting and deploying|against us?
It's pretty clear|that the coalition can win
in Afghanistan and Iraq
in one way or another,
but it will be|a long, hard slog."
It was Christmastime.
I can recall going up|to the secure phone closet.
It's in the second floor|of our house,
not too far from my bedroom.
What was in there|was a noise system
that sounded like an ocean wave.
They had scooped up some people,
low-level people,
who might have some reason|to know where he might be.
He'd been moving|around the country every day,
sleeping a different place,
moving around in taxicabs.
Also moving around|were some body doubles,
people who looked|exactly like Saddam Hussein,
indeed, had the same|distinguishing marks
on their bodies.
Some low-level individual|said that he believed
he knew where|Saddam Hussein was.
They inspected this farm|out in the middle of nowhere.
There was a trapdoor.
They opened this up.
Lo and behold, here was|this bedraggled, bearded man
down in that hole.
Saddam Hussein clearly|concluded it was all a bluff.
The United States|was a paper tiger.
They weren't gonna do anything.
The first Gulf war|left him feeling
that no one|was gonna bother him.
He was the person who prevailed.
He obviously felt|that he was a survivor.
And he was, for a while.
Someone said, "do you want|to go see Saddam Hussein,"
after he was captured.
And I said,|"no."
I said, "I would like|to talk to Tariq Aziz."
It's a complicated situation|for me.
As the number two man,
simultaneously|deputy prime minister
and foreign minister|for Saddam Hussein,
and you meet with him,|you come away
with that he is a perfectly|rational, logical individual.
I've spent hours and hours|with him.
You wonder what goes on|in a mind like that.
I would love to talk|to Tariq Aziz and figure out
what in the world|they were thinking.
What else might|the United States have done
to reach out to them
and get them|to behave rationally.
On February 6, 2003,
to Jim Haynes.
"Subject: Detainees.
I am concerned|that the detainee issues
we were wrestling with|have not been resolved.
And as far as I can see...
...it has just|dropped into a black pit.
We have to get it figured out.|Thanks."
"January 10, 2003.
Subject: Detainees.
I have simply got to know
when you folks|are going to be prepared
to brief the White House|on detainees.
In fact, I don't think|I'll even do it that way.
Instead, let me just say,|you should be prepared
to brief the White House..."
"Subject: The N.S.C."
"Or the principals committee|on detainees,
including the most recent|issue that has been raised,
no later than next Tuesday."
"January 14.
I want to get briefed|on the Iraqi detainees fast.
I'm really worried about it.
Thanks."
When the pictures came,
it had an impact|that was well beyond
anything that I'd experienced.
Why do you think|the pictures did it?
What it showed was people|engaging in acts of abuse
that were disgusting|and revolting.
There were pictures|showing that prison guards
in the midnight shift
were doing things to prisoners|that didn't kill them,
that didn't create injuries|that were permanent,
but they were engaging|in sadistic things,
and there was nudity involved.
I knew that it would create|a advantage for the terrorists,
for Al-Qaeda and for the people|in the insurgency,
who were out recruiting.
They could show|that the Americans
were treating people badly.
It worked against everything|we were trying to do.
I walked in|and said to the president,
"I'm the senior person,|and I believe in accountability.
Here's my resignation."
It was in my handwriting.
I didn't want to dictate it
or have it typed up by somebody.
I felt a very strong sense
that something terrible|had happened on my watch.
He said, "don, I recognize|how you feel about this,
but that's not gonna|solve the problem."
I testified before the house,|testified before the senate,
tried to figure out|how everything happened.
When a ship runs aground,
the captain of the ship's|generally relieved.
You don't relieve|your presidents,
and I couldn't find anyone|that I thought
it would be fair and responsible|to pin the tail on.
So I sat down and wrote|a second letter of resignation,
and I still believe to this day
that I was correct|and it would have been better,
better for the administration|and the department of defense
and better for me,
if the department|could have started fresh
with someone else|in the leadership position.
So you wish|it had been accepted?
Yes.
There's a claim|that the interrogation rules
used in Guantanamo
migrated to Iraq,
where they led|to incredible abuse.
The evidence is to the contrary.
There were 12 investigations
that looked at these issues,
some by civilians,
distinguished people like|Dr. Harold brown
and Dr. James Schlesinger,|former secretaries of defense,
others by military officials.
To suggest that|the procedures from Guantanamo
migrated over to Iraq
is to suggest that|the procedures in Guantanamo
would have encouraged the kind
of unbelievably bad, illegal,|improper behavior
that took place at Abu Ghraib,
and there's nothing|that would have permitted
anything like that.
Anyone who reads|the investigative reports
knows that's not the case.
This is from|the Schlesinger report.
"Changes in D.O.D.|Interrogation policies
between December 2, 2002,|and April 16, 2003,
were an element contributing|to uncertainties in the field
as to which techniques|were authorized.
Although specifically limited|by the secretary of defense
to Guantanamo, and requiring|his personal approval,
given in only two cases,
the augmented techniques|for Guantanamo
migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq
where they were neither limited|nor safeguarded."
Mm-hmm.
Yeah, I think|that's a fair assessment.
Mm-hmm.
Are you saying|stuff just happens?
Well, we know that
in every war|there are things that evolve
that hadn't been planned for|or fully anticipated
and that things occur|which shouldn't occur.
Wouldn't it have been|better not to go there at all?
Well, I guess time will tell.
Barack Obama opposed|most of the structures
that president George W. Bush|put in place:
Guantanamo bay, the concept|of indefinite detention,
the patriot act,|military commissions.
Here we are, years later,
and they're all still there.
I think that kind of has to|validate, to some extent,
the decisions that were made|by president George W. Bush.
We went to Bethesda|and Walter Reed
a great many times.
The strength that you felt|from the families
and the people wounded
was just absolutely|an inspiration.
It was an intensive care unit.
The doctor said,|"this guy's not gonna make it."
We walked in, met the man,|talked to him,
talked to the family.
I don't know what the word is.
But the family--|the wife said,
"I know he'll make it."
I think it was probably|two, three, four weeks later
I went back, and sure as heck,
the doctor said he made it.
Unbelievable.
So we're|a very fortunate country,
and the good lord willing,
we won't have|to be engaged in wars,
but I'm afraid,|human nature being what it is,
that we'll have to continue|to ask young men and women
to come and serve our country,
and their lives will be at risk.
When you're in a position|like secretary of defense,
do you feel that you actually|are in control of history
or that history|is controlling you?
Oh, neither.
Obviously,|you don't control history,
and you are failing|if history controls you.
Are you surprised|when you go back
and read these memos?
Oh, my goodness, yes.
I can't believe|some of the things I wrote.
I don't know where|all those words came from.
"February 4, 2004.
Subject: What you know.
There are knowns knowns.
There are known unknowns.
There are unknown unknowns.
But there are also|unknown knowns.
That is to say,|things that you think you know
that it turns out|you did not."
If you take those words
and try to connect them|in each way that is possible...
There was at least|one more combination
that wasn't there:
The unknown knowns.
Things that|you possibly may know
that you don't know you know.
But the memo doesn't say that.
It says we know less,|not more, than we think we do.
Is that right?|I reversed it?
Put it up again.|Let me see.
"There are also unknown knowns.
That is to say,|things that you think you know
that it turns out you did not."
Yeah, I think that memo|is backwards.
I think that it's closer|to what I said here than that.
Unknown knowns.
I think you're probably, Errol,|chasing the wrong rabbit here.
As ubiquitous|as those suicide bombers
have become in Iraq, far more|people are now being killed
by executions|than by those bombings.
Another 40 bodies today dumped
on the streets of Baghdad,|tortured.
But with|an especially deadly October
and Iraq tipping toward chaos--
the U.S. is on|the brink of failure in Iraq.
A parade of generals called|Rumsfeld’s war strategy flawed.
The democrats are in;|Donald Rumsfeld is out.
Firing secretary of|defense Donald Rumsfeld
and replacing him with a veteran|of his father's administration.
Mr. President,|thank you for your kind words.
The great respect that I have|for your leadership
in this little-understood,|unfamiliar war,
the first war|of the 21st century.
It is not well known.
It was not well understood.
It is complex for people|to comprehend.
And I know with certainty|that, over time,
the contributions you've made|will be recorded by history.
Thank you.
Mr. secretary.
This way.
"December 15, 2006.
To: Pentagon personnel.
From: Donald Rumsfeld.
Subject: 'Snowflakes--
the blizzard is over.'
over the past six years,
thousands of these memos|have fallen,
sometimes in blizzards,
and sometimes in cold|and lonely isolation.
Yet, as surprising|as this may seem
to those who may have been|buried in the deluge,
there are many people|in the department
who have never received|a snowflake.
This snowflake|is especially for them.
Its message is, perhaps|typically, to the point.
Thank you.
The blizzard is over."
One last question.
Why are you doing this?
Why are you talking to me?
That is a vicious question.
I'll be darned if I know.
THE END
Niciun comentariu:
Trimiteți un comentariu