I used to tease him and say
I hoped he appreciated fully|how I handled his departure
from the hotel in San Francisco.
No one ever noticed
that he had the neon sign|on his forehead.
"Mr. President,|I care a great deal
about you as a person|and about your success.
I care deeply about the country
and believe|it is vitally important
that you be re-elected.
The morale is low|in the White House
because of the organizational|approach you have tolerated.
The job you need done|cannot be done
unless major changes|take place."
Dick Cheney and I|both attached our resignations
to the memo.
There wasn't anything|in the memo
I hadn't talked to him about|four, five, six times.
I decided that putting it down|in one place,
deciding to resign,
causing him to register|how strongly we felt about it.
He ended up separating|the positions
of secretary of state|and national security advisor,
which Henry had held|both of them.
And he made|several other changes.
Put George Herbert Walker bush
in the central|intelligence agency.
He wanted to make a change|at the Pentagon,
asked me to become|secretary of defense,
then my deputy, Dick Cheney,|to become chief of staff.
Of course, this becomes|known as the Halloween massacre.
Oh.
I guess it is.
You know, a narrative|gets built out there
over a period of time.
Big personalities|going at each other.
In fact,|it's perfectly understandable.
They represent|different institutions,
and they have|different perspectives.
But it gets written up|in the media
as though it's jealousies|and personalities
and that type of thing|as opposed to
different perspectives.
When Shakespeare wrote history,
it was all character defects,|jealousies,
misunderstandings,
et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
In Shakespeare,|it's the motivating force
of history.
Maybe Shakespeare got it wrong.
Well, you know,|it was a different time.
He was dealing|with different issues.
Maybe he had it right.
Maybe it just was different|later.
Nelson Rockefeller has taken|himself out of consideration
as a vice presidential candidate
on president Ford's ticket|next year.
Rockefeller has|little choice in the matter.
Rumsfeld's calculated plan|to pave his own way
as a running mate|for president Ford.
Donald Rumsfeld has|been mentioned for months
as a possible vice presidential|running mate with president Ford.
...in congress think|his new job
as defense secretary is a means
of putting Rumsfeld|in the running
for the vice presidency.
Donald Rumsfeld|takes over the Pentagon
but also keeps most|of his personal influence
with president Ford.
...the shake-up|took place.
The consensus is that Rumsfeld
again emerged the winner.
Rumsfeld's|conservative influence
at the White House|will be carried on
by 34-year-old|Richard Cheney,
who said in his office|this afternoon,
he'll be running things|just like don did.
In November 1975...
I became the youngest secretary|of defense in history.
It's important, I suppose,
to go back|and set the background
for this occasion.
Henry Kissinger had the job
of fostering Detentes,
a lessening of tension|with the Soviet Union.
The more talk there was|about Detentes
and the more|these negotiations went on
and the more people sat around|clinking champagne glasses
with great big smiles,
and the world saw all of that,
the congress|and the American people
would not be in favor of|increasing defense investment.
It was really fundamental|differences of approach.
Weakness, historically,|tends to prove to be provocative
and create instabilities|in wars and conflicts.
Strength on our part|will contribute
to peace and stability|in the world.
I'm not saying with certainty
that the Russians are coming.
I'm saying the trends are here.
I'm not saying|the Russians are 10 feet tall.
I'm saying they used to be 5'3".
They're now 5'9 1/2",
and they're growing,|and we're not.
To be brand-new|in the department of defense
with a presidential campaign|going on,
my task was to meet with members|of the United States congress.
Small, intimate setting|where I could take
a classified briefing
and show them|the overhead photographs
that were highly classified,|that were top secret,
let them see for themselves|what the Soviet Union was doing.
I would get 6 or 8 or 10 of them
and bring them down|to the Roosevelt room,
which is right|across from the oval office
in the west wing|of the White House.
Not in the Pentagon;|In the White House.
In the White House, absolutely.
If you have a meeting|in the White House
in the Roosevelt room,
and the president stops by
and says hello to 'em,
it is much more memorable|for them.
I had a major fraction of|all the United States senators
and all the members|of the congress
come in to those meetings,
you know, night after|night after night.
When you would show|these photographs to people
from satellites|or from a u-2,
people were amazed by them.
In addition, we prepared a|unclassified series of charts.
One was on U.S./U.S.S.R.|Military manpower.
Another one had U.S. and Soviet|military investment...
Intercontinental|ballistic missile developments...
Changes in|strategic force levels...
Warheads, megatonnage,
estimated production rates.
No one statistic|was determinative.
What was important is,|what were the trend lines?
Did it come as a surprise|that Carter beat Ford in 1976?
He started out way behind.
If it had gone on|another week or two,
he might very well have won.
The republican|national convention
begins here tomorrow, and most|of the players are in place.
Everybody's playing the|vice presidential guessing game.
One big question remains.
Who will be Reagan's|vice presidential choice?
The Republicans are|floating some of the rumors
in an effort to keep--
the list includes former|ambassador George Bush,
who gave Reagan his|toughest primary battle,
or the defense secretary,|Donald Rumsfeld.
The questions about|Rumsfeld are whether his ties
to republican big business are too close
and whether he's too ambitious|to fit in
playing second fiddle to Reagan.
There is the picture|of Donald Rumsfeld
as Machiavelli,|and that you managed
George H.W. Bush|into the CIA
as a way of destroying|his presidential ambitions.
It's utter nonsense.
He had to know the truth.
And why he would|promote that idea--
he must have believed it|for some reason.
I suppose it's kind of|more fun for somebody
to be able to say|they were pushed,
rather than they tripped.
Reagan was up a floor above.
I was with my wife, Joyce.
I had a man glued at my hip,
ready to tell me|if governor Reagan called
and wanted me|to be vice president.
The press was filled|with this excitement
about the possibility|of president Reagan
selecting Gerald R. Ford.
I was stunned at the thought.
It's like sticking four hands|on the steering wheel.
You're gonna end up|putting the truck in the ditch.
My phone rang.
It was governor Reagan.
He said, "don,
I want you to know|that I've decided to have
George Bush be|my vice presidential nominee."
I said, "fantastic.
I am so relieved
that you decided|not to have Gerald Ford."
He said, "oh, no, don.
Jerry and I decided together
that it wouldn't be|a good idea."
It seems to me|that if that decision
had gone|a slightly different way,
you would have been|vice president
and future president|of the United States.
That's possible.
I was living in Illinois
and was chief executive officer|of a pharmaceutical company,
G.D. Searle and co.
In a barracks in Beirut,
a truck loaded with explosives
came racing through the gate,|under the building.
Killed 241 Americans.
Shortly after,|the secretary of state,
George Shultz, called and said
that they wanted me to serve
as special envoy|for president Reagan
to the Middle East.
...with our new representative.
So, don, good luck,|and our hearts are with you.
Mr. President--
I began traveling in the region.
I would send cables back
trying to report back|on my observations.
I entitled one of them,|back in November of 1983,
"the swamp."
"I suspect we ought|to lighten our hand
in the Middle East.
We should move the framework|away from the current situation
where everyone is telling us|everything is our fault
and angry with us
to a basis where|they are seeking our help.
In the future,|we should never use U.S. troops
as a peacekeeping force.
We're too big a target.
Let the Fijians|or New Zealanders do that.
And keep reminding ourselves
that it is easier|to get into something
than it is to get out of it.
I promise you,
you will never hear|out of my mouth the phrase,
'the U.S. seeks|a just and lasting peace
in the Middle East.'
there is little that is just,
and the only things I've seen|that are lasting
are conflict, blackmail,|and killing."
We arrived at night,|as I recall.
The building where|Saddam Hussein had his office
had sandbags all around it
because Baghdad is so close
to the Iranian border.
And they were at war with Iran,
and they were being shelled|from time to time.
We went into this building,|got in an elevator,
went up,|got out of the elevator,
and the three or four people|I was with
were walking along.
All of a sudden,|an Iraqi cut me off
and took me down a corridor,|a dark corridor.
Oh, yeah, I don't know,|20 paces, 30 paces.
And then into a room.
And I was alone in the room,
and I looked up,|and here is this man
in fatigues|with a pistol on his hip.
And it turned out|to be Tariq Aziz,
the deputy prime minister|and foreign minister.
It was hours that we were|in there talking alone.
It looked like|it had leather walls,
padded walls,
maybe Naugahyde or something.
We would have a meeting|with Saddam Hussein
the next morning,|and the time was set.
And we went in,|and there he was.
A brutal dictator|in his military fatigues
with his pistol at his hip.
It was just a preliminary step,
and it became almost iconic...
...my shaking hands|with this brutal dictator
who later became known as|"the butcher of Baghdad."
He postured constantly
and was presenting himself|as the great leader,
which dictators apparently do.
They foster that,|and have schoolkids praise them,
make sure that their image|is everywhere,
whether in a photograph|or a statue,
and cause people|to bow and kowtow.
And, you know, if you see|your picture everywhere
long enough,|and if you see enough statues,
pretty soon you might even|begin to believe that.
He almost became|a caricature of himself,
by my standards, as an outsider|not prone to worship idols.
He was living|his image of himself,
which was pretend.
There are those|who suggest today
that the United States|is in decline,
that, in fact, we should allow
someone else to contribute|to the stability in the world.
I happen to disagree with that,
and I think that we need|to provide leadership,
and I think that leadership|can make an enormous difference
in what the world's gonna look like|in the 1990s and the year 2000.
If you read the newspapers|or watch television today,
and you look at the polls,
first they rank Gorbachev
as the reason that|these changes are occurring,
and second,|they gave Reagan some credit,
which is ridiculous.
The credit belongs|to Truman and Adenauer
and to steadfastness|over a period of 40 years.
The credit goes|to the investments
of billions of dollars
over a long, sustained|period of time
by people who were carped at|and criticized
and said, "oh, my goodness,|you're warmongers."
It went to the concept|of peace through strength.
And we need to understand|how we got to where we are,
because going forward, we're|gonna have to make a judgment
as to what role|our country ought to play,
and a passive role|would be terribly dangerous.
But who do we want to lead--
provide leadership in the world?
Somebody else?
We're here today|to swear in don Rumsfeld
as secretary of defense|and welcome him back
to the public service.
We were colleagues in government|for nearly six years,
and here, quite simply, is a|man who's been an executive,
a statesman, and a human being|of the first order.
I assume that Dick Cheney|brought you
into the bush administration.
I would assume that's the case.
I don't think George W. Bush's|father recommended it.
Obviously, George W. Bush|was his own man,
made his own decisions.
"Subject: Chain of command."
A memo to Condoleezza Rice.
"Because I've failed|to get you and the N.S.C. Staff
to stop giving tasks|to combatant commanders
and the joint staff,
I've drafted|the attached memorandum.
I'd hoped it would|not be necessary
for me to do it this way,
but since your last memo stated
that we should work it out|from our end,
I'm forced to do so.
You are making a mistake.
You're not in|the chain of command.
Since you cannot seem|to accept that fact,
my only choices|are to go to the president
and ask him to tell you to stop
or to tell anyone|in the department of defense
not to respond to you
or the national|security council staff.
I've decided|to take the latter course.
If it fails, I'll have to go|to the president.
One way or other, it will stop,
while I am secretary of defense.
Thanks."
Waging a high-profile war
has thrust Donald Rumsfeld|into the public eye.
Two months into|the war against terror--
Rumsfeld, who has|become the voice of the war.
80% public approval.
Give and take|with the Pentagon press corps
is now must-see television.
Greetings.
Good morning.
Good afternoon.
You know, something's|neither good nor bad
but thinking makes it so,|I suppose.
Yes, you may ask that...
But will I answer that?|No.
I do not want the record to show
that I even bothered|to deny it, however.
So I've decided that|I'm not gonna go asking
for an unclassified|piece of paper.
I don't need it.|You need it.
So you get told things|every day that don't happen.
It doesn't seem|to bother people.
But I'm working my way|over to figuring out
how I won't answer that.
We'll make this|the last question.
Last question.
Mr. secretary, could I just|ask one thing about Gitmo?
Oh, no, no, I love that ending.
I'm--uh--
if you think I'm gonna mess|that one up, you're wrong.
The U.S. and its Afghan|allies clearly have the momentum
in the battle for Tora Bora.
Secretary Rumsfeld admitted|it is unclear
when this fight will end.
The number of|prisoners is climbing.
Two weeks ago,|secretary Rumsfeld dismissed
the idea of detaining|large numbers
of captured fighters.
Well, this week,|he reversed himself,
saying a large number would|likely be taken into custody.
"January 19, 2002."
The subject:
"Status of Taliban|and Al-Qaeda."
"The United States|has determined
that Al-Qaeda and Taliban|individuals
under the control|of the department of defense,
are not entitled|to prisoner of war status
for purposes of the Geneva|conventions of 1949."
Don't you think|that the decision on Geneva
caused so much trouble?
Oh, my goodness, it would|have been so much easier
if you could treat people,|all of them,
the same as prisoners of war.
Then you wouldn't have|to interrogate anybody.
You could just house them|someplace.
Now, would that have been|a responsible thing
for the president|to do? No.
The president needed to know|what was gonna happen next.
Every day,|the intelligence reports said,
"this is a risk.|This is a risk.
Watch out for this.|Something could happen there."
It was the responsibility of the president|to try to prevent a future attack.
Tell you what I'm gonna do.
I am gonna stay here
and answer as many|detainee questions
as need to be answered.
I don't know|that I'll know the answers
to all the questions,|but I--
if I don't, we'll find them,
because it seems to me|it's time to tap down
some of this hyperbole|that we're finding.
Mr. secretary--|Mr. secretary--
- Mr. secretary--|- Mr. secretary.
Is John Walker being treated|the same way
- as the other detainees?|- Yes.
Shackled,|hooded in the transfer--
oh, my goodness.|Now, look.
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