The Unknown Known 2013 - 1st part

The Unknown Known 2013 - 1st part

Let me put up this next memo.
You want me to read this?
Yes, please.
"February 4, 2004.
Subject: What you know.
There are known knowns.
There are known unknowns.
There are unknown unknowns.
But there are also|unknown knowns.
That is to say,|things that you think you know
that it turns out|you did not."
I wonder if in the future
public figures will write|as many memos as I did.
I doubt it.
I must have gotten|in the habit of dictating
things that were important.
Not a diary.
Not a journal.
They're almost all|working documents.
Now, they've become historical|documents in retrospect,
but at the time,|they all had a purpose.
In the later years|of my using the dictaphone,
why, they were called|snowflakes,
because they were|on white paper.
What would you say|the total number of memos
might be?
They said I dictated 20,000
just in the last six years|at the Pentagon.
There have to be millions.
"July 27, 2001."
A memo to Condoleezza Rice|concerning Iraq.
"We have discussed Iraq|on a number of occasions.
The discussions|have been inconclusive.
Sanctions are being limited
in a way that cannot weaken|Saddam Hussein.
We can publicly acknowledge|that the sanctions don't work
over extended periods|and stop the pretense
of having a policy|that is keeping Saddam
'in the box'|when we know he has crawled
a good distance out of the box.
Within a few years,
the U.S. will undoubtedly|have to confront
a Saddam armed|with nuclear weapons.
If Saddam's regime|were oustered,
we would have|a much-improved position
in the region|and elsewhere."
Why the obsession|with Iraq and Saddam?
Well, you love that word,|"obsession."
I can see the glow|in your face when you say it.
Well, I'm an obsessive person.
Are you? I'm not.
I'm--|I'm cool.
I'm measured.
If you look|at the range of my memos,
there might be 1/10 of 1%|about Iraq.
The reason I was concerned|about Iraq
is 'cause four-star generals|would come to me and say,
"Mr. secretary,|we have a problem.
Our orders are to fly over|the northern part of Iraq
and the Southern part of Iraq|on a daily basis,
with the Brits,|and we are getting shot at.
At some moment--|could be tomorrow,
could be next month,|could be next year--
one of our planes|is gonna be shot down
and our pilots and crews|are gonna be killed
or they're gonna be|captured."
The question will be,
"what in the world were|we flying those flights for?
What was|the cost-benefit ratio?
What was our country gaining?"
So you sit down and you say,
"I think I'm gonna see
if I can get|the president's attention.
Remind him that our planes|are being shot at,
remind him that we don't have|a fresh policy for Iraq,
and remind him that we've got|a whole range of options."
Not an obsession.
A very measured,|nuanced approach,
I think.
In my confirmation hearing
when I was nominated|to be secretary of defense,
the best question|I was asked was,
"what do you worry about|when you go to bed at night?"
And my answer was, in effect,
"intelligence.
The danger|that we can be surprised
because of|a failure of imagining
what might happen|in the world."
There are known knowns,|the things we know we know.
There are known unknowns,
the things we know|we don't know.
There are also|that third category
of unknown unknowns,
the things we don't know|we don't know.
And you can only know more|about those things
by imagining what they might be.
Pearl harbor was|a failure of imagination.
We didn't know we didn't know
that they could do what they|did the way they did it.
We had people working|on breaking codes.
We had people thinking through,
"what are the kinds of things|they might do?"
And lo and behold,|the carriers were able to,
on a Sunday morning,|get very close to Hawaii,
launch their planes, and|impose enormous destruction.
Was it failure of imagination
or failure to look|at the intelligence
that was available?
They had thought through
a great many|more obvious possibilities.
People were chasing|the wrong rabbit.
That one possibility|was not something
that they had imagined|was likely.
"July 23, 2001.
Subject:|'Pearl harbor post-mortem.'
in some future hearing,
I am going to say|that I do not want
to be sitting before this panel
in a modern-day version|of a pearl harbor post-mortem:
Who didn't do what,|when, where, and why.
None of us would want|to have to be back here
going through that agony."
A month or so before|September 11, 2001,
it would be wrong to think|that someone who wrote it--
namely me, was prescient.
I wasn't.
I simply had read enough history
that I worried.
American 11, climb,
maintain flight level 350.
American 11, climb,|maintain flight level 350.
American 11, Boston.
The American on the frequency,|how do you hear me?
American 11,|if you hear Boston center
re-contact Boston center|on 127.82.
That's American 11, 127.82.
My military assistant,
admiral Ed Giambastiani,|came in and said,
"a plane has hit|the world trade center."
It was assumed|to be an accident.
And I went into my office|from the conference room,
and admiral Giambastiani said,|"another plane has hit
the other world|trade center tower."
And of course, at that point,
it wasn't an accident;|It was an attack.
Within minutes,|I felt the Pentagon shake.
That's how our day began|on September 11th.
They had hit the center|of economic power in New York,
and they then had hit|the center of military power
at the Pentagon.
You need to find out|what had happened.
What was it?
I got up and|went down the hall, and--
on my floor,|until the smoke was so bad
I had to get outside.
Then I went downstairs and|outside and around the corner,
and here were pieces of|that American airlines airplane
just spread all over the apron,|all over the grass.
Flames and smoke,
people being brought out|of the building
who were injured|and burned and wounded.
The first responders|really hadn't arrived yet.
There were|very few people there.
How do you think|that they got away with 9/11?
It seems amazing in retrospect.
Everything seems amazing|in retrospect.
Pearl harbor seems amazing|in retrospect.
It's a failure of imagination.
It's not as though you aren't|aware of possibilities,
but you tend to favor|some possibilities
more than others.
And it's enormously important|to have priorities.
What are you gonna worry about?
What is it you want to do?
What are you gonna|be prepared for?
And you have to pick and choose.
Well, to the extent|you pick and choose
and you're wrong...
...the penalty can be enormous.
"September 30, 2001."
Memorandum.|Title: "Strategic thoughts."
"The U.S. strategic theme|should be aiding local peoples
to rid themselves of terrorists
and to free themselves|of regimes
that support terrorism.
The regimes of such states|should see that it will be fatal
to host terrorists|who attack the United States.
The United States government|should envision
a goal along these lines.
New regimes in Afghanistan|and another key state or two
that supports terrorism.
Syria out of Lebanon.
Dismantlement or destruction
of weapons of mass destruction|capabilities.
If the war does not|significantly change
the world's political map,
the U.S. will not|achieve its aim."
On my orders,|the United States military
has begun strikes
against Al-Qaeda|terrorist training camps
and military installations
of the Taliban regime|in Afghanistan.
In relatively short order,|a matter of weeks,
Kabul was occupied,
the Taliban was defeated
and run out of the country|in large measure,
and a lot of Al-Qaeda|were killed.
Osama Bin Laden escaped|into Pakistan eventually.
The target of the|largest manhunt in history
still eludes capture.
Cave by cave, for any sign
of Osama Bin Laden,|dead or alive.
The high probability that|Osama Bin Laden is still alive.
With Afghanistan's|porous borders,
it's possible Bin Laden|has already slipped
out of the country.
Osama gets away,|and a confusion sets in.
People began to think|that Saddam was connected
with Al-Qaeda and with 9/11.
Oh, I don't think so.
It was very clear that|the direct planning for 9/11
was done by|Osama Bin Laden's people,
Al-Qaeda,|and in Afghanistan.
I don't think|the American people
were confused about that.
In 2003,|in a Washington Post poll,
69% said they believe|it is likely
the Iraqi leader|was personally involved
in the attacks|carried out by Al-Qaeda.
I don't remember anyone|in the bush administration
saying anything like that,
nor do I recall|anyone believing that.
Mr. secretary, today|in a broadcast interview was--
Saddam Hussein said,|"there is only one truth.
Iraq has no weapons|of mass destruction whatsoever."
And he went on to say,
"I would like to tell you|directly
we have no relationship|with Al-Qaeda."
And Abraham Lincoln was short.
Would you care|to respond directly
to what Saddam Hussein|has said today?
I--
how does one respond to that?
It's just a continuous pattern.
This is a case of the local liar|coming up again
and people repeating|what he said
and forgetting to say|that he never--
almost never--|rarely tells the truth.
There are two sides to the coin.
One is,
"belief in the inevitability|of conflict
can become one|of its main causes."
That is a truth.
The other side of the coin,|which is also true, is,
"if you wish for peace,|prepare for war."
But if both were true,
well, you can use that|to justify anything.
There's a similar thing|in Rumsfeld’s rules
where I say,
"all generalizations are false,
including this one."
There it is.
The president did|harden his stand towards--
the United States|is on the road to war.
Administration|officials say the effort
to pressure Iraq has moved|into a final phase.
All the military pieces|should be in place
to go to war with Iraq.
On January 11, 2003,
the vice president's office|called
and requested that I come over|to meet with him
and the Saudi ambassador,|prince Bandar.
It was unusual.|I mean, I--
I wasn't often|in the vice president's office.
We sat down.
Dick proceeded to tell Bandar
that the president|was going to invade Iraq
and change the regime in Iraq.
That was the first time|that I'd heard anything
that sounded truly definitive.
What was the Saudi|ambassador's reaction to this?
He wanted reassurance|that when it was all over,
Saddam Hussein would be gone.
They needed to know|that the president was serious.
That is why, I'm sure,
the vice president said it|the way he said it.
Is it at all strange|that you would hear about it
in this way?
No.
No, I don't think so.
If the purpose of the war|is to get rid of Saddam Hussein,
why can't they just|assassinate him?
Why do you have|to invade his country?
Who's "they?"
Us.
You said, "they."
You didn't say, "we."
Well, "we."
I will rephrase it.
Why do we have to do that?
We don't assassinate|leaders of other countries.
Well, Dora Farms,|we were doing our best.
That was an act of war.
The beginning of the war,
even before it started,
George tenet came to see me|in my office at the Pentagon.
He said, "we think we know|where Saddam Hussein is."
I said, "terrific,"|and I called the White House
and said to the president,|"we're coming over."
We met in his office.
George tenet would go|from the oval office
in to a side office|and talk to the people
in the central|intelligence agency
who were talking to the agents|on the ground in Iraq.
The word came back
that somebody had identified|Saddam Hussein
as being at Dora Farms.
George tenet was convinced|that his people on the ground
were giving him|the straight dope.
They were certain he was there.
We'd put on alert aircraft.
The aircraft took off|and went to that location.
The president|went around the room asking,
"should we do this|or not?"
Everyone in the room,|as I recall,
agreed it was|sufficiently solid intelligence,
sufficient to do it.
We just were so hopeful
that by killing Saddam Hussein,
we could end the need for a war,
that in fact, by that act,|you would change the regime.
The planes went in,|and they struck the farm...
...killed some people.
They came out|with a stretcher with a body.
People there|on the ground asserted
that it was Saddam Hussein.
They think they killed him.
And it turned out, it was not.
What a wonderful|thing it would have been
if he could have been killed.
The war would have been avoided.
It's possible.
May not have been,
but it's possible.
You wonder why|they didn't respond
to all the efforts|that were made
to avoid that war.
How could they be that mixed up
in what the inevitable|next steps would be?
Why they wouldn't sit down
and have|an agonizing reappraisal,
and it come to some|logical conclusion?
I was elected to congress.
I was 30 years old.
It was during the Vietnam war|and the civil rights era.
There were big issues before us.
I would come back sometimes
knowing I didn't know|if I voted right,
that there are arguments here|and there were arguments there.
"Ugh, I hope I voted|the right way.
Why did I do what I did?"
And I'd sit down|and dictate that.
After almost every vote,|every amendment,
I would go back|with my little dictaphone.
I would dictate a note and say,
"here was the vote.
The ayes were this.|The nays were that.
Here were the amendments,|and here's what I did
and why I did it."
And then when I went|in the executive branch,
I would want to clarify|my own thinking,
so I would try to put it down|on paper and edit it,
and I'd go through|three, four, five drafts,
getting it the way|I really wanted it.
I would do it|for communications to my staff.
I wanted them to know|what I was thinking.
Did you imagine|that they would produce
this vast archive?
Oh, it never crossed my mind.
I never knew|what I was gonna do next.
The only thing I've ever|volunteered for in my life--
one was to go in the Navy,
and the other was|to run for congress.
The other was to get married.
You look at being|married to the same woman
all those decades--
when you're 20, 21, 22,
what did you know?
Both of us were young|and unformed.
How in the world|can you be that lucky?
How did you propose?
Imperfectly.
I was getting ready|to leave for Pensacola.
About 10:00 in the morning,|I said to my folks,
"I'll be back.
I'm gonna go down|and see Joyce."
I asked her to marry me.
I didn't get down on my knees.
I didn't do anything fancy.
I didn't want to get married,
but I sure as heck|didn't want her
to marry anyone else.
And I was correct.
It was a good decision.
It just hadn't been|part of my plan.
Director of the|office of economic opportunity
was Rumsfeld’s first job|for Richard Nixon.
Later, when O.E.O. Seemed|headed for extinction,
Mr. Nixon named him director|of the cost of living council.
After friction developed
between Rumsfeld|and H.R. Haldeman,
Rumsfeld requested a change
and was sent to Brussels|as the U.S. ambassador
to the north Atlantic|treaty organization.
He got out just in time
and survived Watergate|with reputation intact.
A person who works|that hard to become president
had to believe that|everything he did or thought
would be useful to preserve.
He puts in place|these recording devices,
like other presidents had,
and then he'd go about|being himself,
and sometimes|he'd let his hair down
and say things in ways|that he might not have said
had he remembered|that each second of the day
that it was being recorded.
All of us say things|we shouldn't say,
that on reflection,|we wish we hadn't said.
I expect he just felt that|on balance,
everything was worth preserving
because he was|an historic figure.
Did presidents after|Nixon make recordings
in the White House?
The only president|I was close enough to
to answer that question about|was Gerald R. Ford,
and I can assure you he did not.
My guess is that people|tend not to fall
in exactly the same potholes
that their predecessors do.
More often than not,|they make original mistakes.
We all do.
But I assume the presidency|under extraordinary...
Gerald Ford had announced,|when he first took office,
that he was not gonna have|a chief of staff.
He was going to be|the anti-Nixon,
the anti-Haldeman,|the anti-Ehrlichman.
He had said he was|gonna have a coordinator
or something like that.
And that's when I told him
he'd have to find somebody else,
because it wasn't gonna work,
and I didn't want|to be a party to it.
After a while,|he agreed that I was right.
At the time,|there were a number of people
still being looked at|by what was then called,
"the special prosecutor."
This is really|an extraordinary moment.
The White House is filled|with lawyers and investigators.
That's exactly right.
It was September 29, 1974,
in the morning|that I dictated this memo
on the subject of the safe|in the chief of staff's office.
"I arrived|at approximately 5:00 P.M.
I wanted to clean out the|place so that I could move in,
and I wanted to make sure that|there was nothing in the place
that I didn't want there,
such as recording equipment,|telephone bugs, and the like.
At approximately 5:15 P.M.,
bill Walker commented|that there was a safe
in the cupboard."
This says, "to the left|of the fireplace."
If you're standing|in the fireplace,
it was to the left.
Actually, it was to the right
if you faced the fireplace.
So here's a safe,|and it's locked.
And I thought, "oh, my goodness.
I wonder|what's in that safe?"
I said to Dick Cheney,
my assistant who was helping me,
"look, why don't we get|the secret service,
get 'em down here with people|who can move the safe
and open it|or do whatever they have to do."
And what happened|to the safe in the end?
The end for me was when|I got it out of my office
under a proper|chain of evidence.
♪ I'm dreaming ♪
♪ of a white Christmas ♪
♪ just like the ones ♪
♪ I used to know ♪
♪ where the treetops glisten ♪
♪ and children listen ♪
They put the word out,
"stay tuned|to armed forces radio.
When you hear it said
that the temperature is rising|to 105 degrees
and you hear, 'I'm dreaming|of a white Christmas,'
you'll know|the evacuation is ordered."
The north Vietnamese|and Viet Cong forces
moved into Saigon
directly towards|the U.S. facilities.
The scenes of the helicopter
lifting people off|of the roof of the building
were really heartbreaking,
because you had|really wonderful people
who'd worked with our forces
and knew that their circumstance
when the Vietcong|and north Vietnamese
took over that country|would be difficult,
that they'd be killed|or put in jail.
They kept lifting|more and more out,
and more kept coming.
They ended up landing|so many helicopters
on the carrier that they|started shoving helicopters off
so that they could get|more helicopters on.
Were you with the president|when all of this was going down?
Yes, I was in the oval office
with secretary Kissinger|and the president
and other close aides|to the president.
It was a day anyone involved|will never forget.
The inevitable ugly ending|of an unsuccessful effort.
Do you think that there's|a lesson to be taken from this?
Well, one would hope|that most things
that happen in life|prove to be lessons.
Some things work out.
Some things don't.|That didn't.
If that's a lesson--|yes, it's a lesson.
President Gerald Ford|had given a talk
to a labor group.
He went out the back,
and we went into|a freight elevator.
The doors went open,
we walked out,
and the top door came back down,
and it hit Gerald Ford|right across the forehead.
And he ended up with a cut|about an inch and a half wide.
Of course, at that moment,|Chevy chase and these people
were talking about Ford|bumping his head
or stumbling.
So we went up in the room|and the doctor started
putting powder on it|to see if he could calm it down
so it didn't look like|a neon sign.
It came time to leave.
He waved and shook hands.
Got out to the street corner...
A shot rang out.
Sara Jane Moore|was across the street,
fired a bullet.
It went by his head,
by the secret service|guy's head,
by my head.
A matter of inches|from both of us.
We got in the car,
pushed him down|on the floor, and...
Secret service man on top,|I'm on top.
The car races out of the city...
...not knowing|what might be next.
Finally you hear|this muffled thing
from president Ford,|and he says,
"come on, you guys.
Get off.|You're heavy."
And so we sat up,
went to the airplane, and left.