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Gabrielle (2013) - 1st part

Hey, Fred Astaire.|Take a seat.

This isn't|'Dancing with the Stars'.

Girls, here's your note.

- It's frizzy.|- Like a poodle.

You here for a perm or to sing?

Gabrielle, your bracelets.

All together.|Ladies...

3, 4...

I took off

On Quebecair, Transworld,|Northern, Eastern, Western...

You're singing from your head.

Remember to breathe.|Loosen your diaphragm.

The clap is too soft. Keep it sharp.|Together now, 3, 4...

Good. When you sing,|don't forget to listen.

From the top.

I'm taking off

- Genevičve?|- Tired...

She should stay home.|Stay home if you're so tired.

Philippe!

Do you want to do the show?

Yes!

With Charlebois?|For sure!

Will he really sing with us?

Of course!

He hasn't practiced.

He's a pro, it's his job.

How'll he manage?

Tired.

Gab, c'mere.|We'll sing the desert song.

Everybody up!|Genevičve, Philippe, get up.

1, 2, 3, 4...

Anthony...

Good.|Daniel.

Everybody.

- Laurent?|- Yeah.

Out of the way, Mozart.

What's up, Gaby?

I need some panties, please.

Corning in.

- Here.|- Thanks.

Let's check your blood sugar.

Can you buy me tampons?|I want to try them swimming.

Tampons?

Tampons?

It's alright,|I'll do it myself.

Michael, you can see the bathroom's|busy. Use the other one.

- My beard...|- We'll shave later.

- Later, later, Laurent.|- Bye, dude.

Let me help.|It's upside down.

Give it to me, Gaby.

I can do it myself!

Philippe, change places with Martin.

Anthony, you change too.

Good, Michael.|Make them wolves howl.

Daniel, Simon, change places.

- My leg hurts.|- Singing will make it better.

Here we go.

The trees bend

It is stronger,|stronger than all

Hanging from the branches

The air seems softer still

In the trampled grass

Counting my regrets

The crack of a match

And everything|goes up in smoke

While the fields burn

I wait for my tears to come

And when the plains ripple

Nothing will touch me again

That night we kissed

Without saying a word

And all around us

The world could|have collapsed

Rings under my eyes

Dust in my hair

Up and down my legs

The caress of flames

While the fields burn

I wait for my tears to come

And when the plains ripple

Nothing will touch me again

My mom.

Hi, Claire!

Bye, Martin.

- Hi, Gabrielle.|- Hello!

Want a lift, Gab?

No, I don't know the way.

- Gaby!|- Martin!

How do you say "hair"?

Bal.

Yup.

"Water"?

Pani.

Just the ends, right?

Just the ends.

I miss Raphaél.

Me too.

He'll be back soon, right?

Martin's going to|love your look.

Martin!

My darling!

Watch out!

You know the place,|except this.

It's new this year, the mezzanine.

And above all

the shower stall, indoors.

A real palace!

That sweet Sao!

We went to his village.|I have to take you.

Two hours by motorcycle,|but another world.

The light. The views.|No electricity or running water.

I told them,|"Keep Sao in school. "

They don't see why he needs|to know math or writing.

You should hear him on the sitar.|He's brilliant!

Enough about me.|How are you?

Me, I live in a city with|too much electricity,

too much water, no cows.

I have to wear a helmet|on my scooter.

I quit my job teaching kids|who don't want to go to school,

and my lover's halfway|round the world.

- So join him.|- I need to sublet the apartment.

- And your sister?|- What about her?

Did you tell her?

Gab is in love.

A boyfriend?|Like, kissing and stuff?

Well, yeah, maybe.

That's great. Perfect even.|A guy from the Center?

She says thanks|for the bracelets.

Sophie?

You didn't tell her!

Look, she'll understand.

- Well...|- She will. She'll come around.

She has a boyfriend.|Don't wait, it'll be harder.

I know.

Pack Gabrielle in your suitcase.|With her boyfriend.

- I love you.|- Me too.

Hurry up!|Get over here!

- It's Sophie.|- Yes.

- And Mozart.|- Right, Mozart! Nice doggie, huh?

- Who's this?|- My mom.

- And him?|- He's my dad.

- Your dad.|- Hi, Dad.

It's too small for me.

They're masks like in Venice.

- You went to Italy?|- I'm scared of flying.

- I've never taken a plane.|- Me neither.

This is where I work.

- Pet sh...|- Yeah, the pet shop.

It's a nice card.

We have rabbits, fish, frogs...

The puppies are this big.

They're soft.|So soft.

Mom says she's allergic,|but I don't believe her.

So I have a turtle.

- Not as furry.|- Not as furry!

Take a deep breath.

They're from India.

The green's for when you get married.|It brings good luck.

- They're beautiful.|- I love them.

You're not my brother.

Hi, I'm Michael.|What's your name?

Hi, Michael. I'm Claire.|I met you at the Center.

Of course, I know everything.

Your brother's coming|next week, Michael.

- Hello.|- Hi.

- Everything OK?|- Sure.

We watched a film.|But Martin and Gaby...

- Hi, Claire! Things good?|- Fine, and you?

Not another Olympic Stadium, JF?

They don't hear us.|I'm coming in.

That night we kissed...

Martin?

Without speaking

Get dressed!

- Has it dried?|- Yes.

- It's not a real one.|- No.

Not a real one.

Put on your top, Gabrielle.

It dries faster than henna, right?

Sure.

Henna's for your hair.

Mom puts it in her hair,|but don't touch it cause it stains.

- Sorry.|- That's OK.

It's just...

Well...

Do you think...

Do you think they|touched each other?

Goodness!

Gabrielle, did you touch|Martin's penis?

No, I didn't touch his penis.

- There was no touching.|- It's just...

They're just tattoos.|Harmless.

They're just tattoos.

Lipstick.

Robert Charlebois and|The Muses of Montreal Choir

Gabrielle?

I'm in love with|Robert Charlebois.

No, I'm just kidding!

I'm going to your show|at the Choir Festival.

Thanks, France!

I go every year with my friend.

Robert Charlebois, that's big!

You're going to be stars.|It's great.

Thank you.

Save some for your boyfriend.

Come on.

Thank you.

My lovely daughters.

- Hi, Mom.|- Hello.

- Hi, John.|- Hi, Gaby.

Let's have dinner|before you leave?

Sure, OK.

These are my daughters.|Sophie.

- And Gabrielle.|- It's a pleasure.

I'll introduce you to Mandu.|He's from Bombay.

He knows everyone there.

Great guy.

You're off to India!|The musician.

I'm a teacher.|Gabrielle has the gift.

Perfect pitch, like my dad.

Sophie nearly tore my|leg off on her scooter.

She drives like a madman.

You're exaggerating.

Your husband's|teaching in India?

Yes, but I'm not married.

It's a wonderful project.|They help underprivileged kids.

Will you be teaching music?

In fact, they teach|traditional Indian music,

so I'd teach English.

Indian music is|extremely complex.

It's very difficult to learn.

You should learn to play the sitar.|I love the sitar.

I'm not 100% sure I'll go,|it's complicated.

It's simple. You have your plane|ticket, a fantastic boyfriend...

Shit, Mom.|You really did it.

- You didn't tell her?|- I couldn't.

Sorry.|I'll speak to her.

No, I'll do it.|Mom, it's alright.

I'm hungry.|I want to go.

India's not for sure, right?

The bus is late.

It's unreliable.

Here.|Did you get yours, Michael?

Come on, bus.|Let's go!

- Do you have one?|- Yeah, I have mine.

Simon! You're not alone on the bus.|There are other people.

Do you know that Gabrielle|is very, very happy?

Dinosaurs.

How do dinosaurs go to|the bathroom in water?

You're covered in ice cream.|Here, wipe yourself off.

Let's go see the fish.

Hello.

How are you?

Did you see the white one?|It's beautiful.

- It's so beautiful.|- I'd like one.

You're so beautiful!

I know.

Is that a budgie?

No, it's a parrot.

Come here,|you little critter.

Little critter.

Here.

Hello, critter.

That's enough petting.

Careful!

Do you want to feed him?

Here you go.

Great.

Look, these ones are naked.

- They're babies?|- Yeah, they're babies.

- They have no fur.|- No fur.

The dad's over there.

- He's the dad?|- Yup, he's the dad.

He's kept away|because he could eat them,

they're too small.

- He eats his own babies?|- Yeah, he's jealous.

That's the way hamsters are.|They're jealous.

And you can't touch the babies.|So we don't wash this cage.

If the babies smell of humans,|the mom can't recognize them.

Even worse,|she might eat them.

I'm glad my mom didn't eat me.

The Unkown known (2013) - 3nd part and last one,2

No, that's someone|else's business.

Quagmire's the--|I don't do quagmires.

As I looked at the dictionary,

I'm not uncomfortable|with "unconventional,"

because it is not an army,|and it is not a Navy,

and it is not an air force.

But even there,|the dictionary--

the Pentagon dictionary--

I haven't looked|in a regular dictionary.

The Pentagon dictionary does not|even land that one perfectly

on what's taking place.

The bush administration has been

on a stepped-up P.R. Campaign

to stop the erosion|of support at home

for the dangerous mission|in Iraq.

Today, an unprecedented|series of bombings

left a trail|of death and devastation.

The concern|that Iraq's reconstruction is,

in fact, falling well short|of expectations.

Today in Fallujah,|Iraqi guerrillas

used a roadside bomb to bring|an American patrol to--

Briggs accused the Rumsfeld|team of being under-prepared

for post-war conditions|on the ground and unwilling

to share decision-making|with other government agencies.

Acknowledgement|that long-simmering tensions

over Iraq and its aftermath,|particularly between

the departments of state|and defense,

have now reached full boil.

October of 2003.

I became worried|that we were having trouble

measuring progress,

and I wrote a memo called|"global war on terror."

"Are we winning or losing|the global war on terror?

Is D.O.D. Changing|fast enough to deal

with the new 21st-century|security environment?

Are the changes we have|and are making too modest

and incremental?

My impression is that|we have not yet

made truly bold moves,

although we have made many|sensible, logical moves

in the right direction."

"But are they enough," I asked.

"Today we lack metrics to know

if we are winning or losing|the global war on terror.

Are we killing or deterring|more terrorists every day

than the madrassas|and the radical clerics

are recruiting and deploying|against us?

It's pretty clear|that the coalition can win

in Afghanistan and Iraq

in one way or another,

but it will be|a long, hard slog."

It was Christmastime.

I can recall going up|to the secure phone closet.

It's in the second floor|of our house,

not too far from my bedroom.

What was in there|was a noise system

that sounded like an ocean wave.

They had scooped up some people,

low-level people,

who might have some reason|to know where he might be.

He'd been moving|around the country every day,

sleeping a different place,

moving around in taxicabs.

Also moving around|were some body doubles,

people who looked|exactly like Saddam Hussein,

indeed, had the same|distinguishing marks

on their bodies.

Some low-level individual|said that he believed

he knew where|Saddam Hussein was.

They inspected this farm|out in the middle of nowhere.

There was a trapdoor.

They opened this up.

Lo and behold, here was|this bedraggled, bearded man

down in that hole.

Saddam Hussein clearly|concluded it was all a bluff.

The United States|was a paper tiger.

They weren't gonna do anything.

The first Gulf war|left him feeling

that no one|was gonna bother him.

He was the person who prevailed.

He obviously felt|that he was a survivor.

And he was, for a while.

Someone said, "do you want|to go see Saddam Hussein,"

after he was captured.

And I said,|"no."

I said, "I would like|to talk to Tariq Aziz."

It's a complicated situation|for me.

As the number two man,

simultaneously|deputy prime minister

and foreign minister|for Saddam Hussein,

and you meet with him,|you come away

with that he is a perfectly|rational, logical individual.

I've spent hours and hours|with him.

You wonder what goes on|in a mind like that.

I would love to talk|to Tariq Aziz and figure out

what in the world|they were thinking.

What else might|the United States have done

to reach out to them

and get them|to behave rationally.

On February 6, 2003,

to Jim Haynes.

"Subject: Detainees.

I am concerned|that the detainee issues

we were wrestling with|have not been resolved.

And as far as I can see...

...it has just|dropped into a black pit.

We have to get it figured out.|Thanks."

"January 10, 2003.

Subject: Detainees.

I have simply got to know

when you folks|are going to be prepared

to brief the White House|on detainees.

In fact, I don't think|I'll even do it that way.

Instead, let me just say,|you should be prepared

to brief the White House..."

"Subject: The N.S.C."

"Or the principals committee|on detainees,

including the most recent|issue that has been raised,

no later than next Tuesday."

"January 14.

I want to get briefed|on the Iraqi detainees fast.

I'm really worried about it.

Thanks."

When the pictures came,

it had an impact|that was well beyond

anything that I'd experienced.

Why do you think|the pictures did it?

What it showed was people|engaging in acts of abuse

that were disgusting|and revolting.

There were pictures|showing that prison guards

in the midnight shift

were doing things to prisoners|that didn't kill them,

that didn't create injuries|that were permanent,

but they were engaging|in sadistic things,

and there was nudity involved.

I knew that it would create|a advantage for the terrorists,

for Al-Qaeda and for the people|in the insurgency,

who were out recruiting.

They could show|that the Americans

were treating people badly.

It worked against everything|we were trying to do.

I walked in|and said to the president,

"I'm the senior person,|and I believe in accountability.

Here's my resignation."

It was in my handwriting.

I didn't want to dictate it

or have it typed up by somebody.

I felt a very strong sense

that something terrible|had happened on my watch.

He said, "don, I recognize|how you feel about this,

but that's not gonna|solve the problem."

I testified before the house,|testified before the senate,

tried to figure out|how everything happened.

When a ship runs aground,

the captain of the ship's|generally relieved.

You don't relieve|your presidents,

and I couldn't find anyone|that I thought

it would be fair and responsible|to pin the tail on.

So I sat down and wrote|a second letter of resignation,

and I still believe to this day

that I was correct|and it would have been better,

better for the administration|and the department of defense

and better for me,

if the department|could have started fresh

with someone else|in the leadership position.

So you wish|it had been accepted?

Yes.

There's a claim|that the interrogation rules

used in Guantanamo

migrated to Iraq,

where they led|to incredible abuse.

The evidence is to the contrary.

There were 12 investigations

that looked at these issues,

some by civilians,

distinguished people like|Dr. Harold brown

and Dr. James Schlesinger,|former secretaries of defense,

others by military officials.

To suggest that|the procedures from Guantanamo

migrated over to Iraq

is to suggest that|the procedures in Guantanamo

would have encouraged the kind

of unbelievably bad, illegal,|improper behavior

that took place at Abu Ghraib,

and there's nothing|that would have permitted

anything like that.

Anyone who reads|the investigative reports

knows that's not the case.

This is from|the Schlesinger report.

"Changes in D.O.D.|Interrogation policies

between December 2, 2002,|and April 16, 2003,

were an element contributing|to uncertainties in the field

as to which techniques|were authorized.

Although specifically limited|by the secretary of defense

to Guantanamo, and requiring|his personal approval,

given in only two cases,

the augmented techniques|for Guantanamo

migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq

where they were neither limited|nor safeguarded."

Mm-hmm.

Yeah, I think|that's a fair assessment.

Mm-hmm.

Are you saying|stuff just happens?

Well, we know that

in every war|there are things that evolve

that hadn't been planned for|or fully anticipated

and that things occur|which shouldn't occur.

Wouldn't it have been|better not to go there at all?

Well, I guess time will tell.

Barack Obama opposed|most of the structures

that president George W. Bush|put in place:

Guantanamo bay, the concept|of indefinite detention,

the patriot act,|military commissions.

Here we are, years later,

and they're all still there.

I think that kind of has to|validate, to some extent,

the decisions that were made|by president George W. Bush.

We went to Bethesda|and Walter Reed

a great many times.

The strength that you felt|from the families

and the people wounded

was just absolutely|an inspiration.

It was an intensive care unit.

The doctor said,|"this guy's not gonna make it."

We walked in, met the man,|talked to him,

talked to the family.

I don't know what the word is.

But the family--|the wife said,

"I know he'll make it."

I think it was probably|two, three, four weeks later

I went back, and sure as heck,

the doctor said he made it.

Unbelievable.

So we're|a very fortunate country,

and the good lord willing,

we won't have|to be engaged in wars,

but I'm afraid,|human nature being what it is,

that we'll have to continue|to ask young men and women

to come and serve our country,

and their lives will be at risk.

When you're in a position|like secretary of defense,

do you feel that you actually|are in control of history

or that history|is controlling you?

Oh, neither.

Obviously,|you don't control history,

and you are failing|if history controls you.

Are you surprised|when you go back

and read these memos?

Oh, my goodness, yes.

I can't believe|some of the things I wrote.

I don't know where|all those words came from.

"February 4, 2004.

Subject: What you know.

There are knowns knowns.

There are known unknowns.

There are unknown unknowns.

But there are also|unknown knowns.

That is to say,|things that you think you know

that it turns out|you did not."

If you take those words

and try to connect them|in each way that is possible...

There was at least|one more combination

that wasn't there:

The unknown knowns.

Things that|you possibly may know

that you don't know you know.

But the memo doesn't say that.

It says we know less,|not more, than we think we do.

Is that right?|I reversed it?

Put it up again.|Let me see.

"There are also unknown knowns.

That is to say,|things that you think you know

that it turns out you did not."

Yeah, I think that memo|is backwards.

I think that it's closer|to what I said here than that.

Unknown knowns.

I think you're probably, Errol,|chasing the wrong rabbit here.

As ubiquitous|as those suicide bombers

have become in Iraq, far more|people are now being killed

by executions|than by those bombings.

Another 40 bodies today dumped

on the streets of Baghdad,|tortured.

But with|an especially deadly October

and Iraq tipping toward chaos--

the U.S. is on|the brink of failure in Iraq.

A parade of generals called|Rumsfeld’s war strategy flawed.

The democrats are in;|Donald Rumsfeld is out.

Firing secretary of|defense Donald Rumsfeld

and replacing him with a veteran|of his father's administration.

Mr. President,|thank you for your kind words.

The great respect that I have|for your leadership

in this little-understood,|unfamiliar war,

the first war|of the 21st century.

It is not well known.

It was not well understood.

It is complex for people|to comprehend.

And I know with certainty|that, over time,

the contributions you've made|will be recorded by history.

Thank you.

Mr. secretary.

This way.

"December 15, 2006.

To: Pentagon personnel.

From: Donald Rumsfeld.

Subject: 'Snowflakes--

the blizzard is over.'

over the past six years,

thousands of these memos|have fallen,

sometimes in blizzards,

and sometimes in cold|and lonely isolation.

Yet, as surprising|as this may seem

to those who may have been|buried in the deluge,

there are many people|in the department

who have never received|a snowflake.

This snowflake|is especially for them.

Its message is, perhaps|typically, to the point.

Thank you.

The blizzard is over."

One last question.

Why are you doing this?

Why are you talking to me?

That is a vicious question.

I'll be darned if I know.

THE END

The Unkown known (2013) - 3nd part and last one

Is he being treated|like the other detainees,

shackled, hooded,|and what have you?

Oh, well,|let me say this about that.

When people are moved,|they are restrained.

That is true in prisons|across the globe.

Will any single prisoner|be treated humanely?

You bet.

When they are being moved|from place to place,

will they be restrained in a way

so that they are less likely|to be able to

kill an American soldier?

You bet.

Is it inhumane|to do that? No.

Would it be stupid|to do anything else?

Yes.

Mr. secretary--

what about all these|so-called "torture memos?"

Well, there were, what,|one or two or three.

I don't know the number,|but there were not

"all" of these|so-called memos.

They were mischaracterized|as torture memos,

and they came, not out of|the bush administration per se,

but they came out of|the U.S. department of justice,

blessed by the Attorney General,

the senior legal official|of the United States of America,

having been nominated|by a president and confirmed

by the United States senate|overwhelmingly.

Little different cast|I just put on it

than the one you did.

I'll chalk that one up.

Was the reaction unfair?

Well, I've never read them.

- Really?|- No.

I'm not a lawyer.|What would I know?

I've never seen so much|misinformation communicated

about a place than was the case|about Guantanamo bay, Cuba.

This prison was|exceedingly well-run,

yet the impression that's left

is that it was a terrible place,

and people were tortured,|and people were abused.

Prisons aren't pretty places,

but that prison|is probably as well-run

as any prison|on the face of the earth.

If you go and ask somebody|in a big audience,

"how many people do you think|were waterboarded

at Guantanamo?"

And people stick their hands up,|and someone will say,

"well, hundreds."

The answer is,|"nobody."

Zero were waterboarded|at Guantanamo.

The military|never waterboarded anybody

in an interrogation.

The CIA waterboarded,|as I understand it,

three people.

But it wasn't at Guantanamo,|and it wasn't done

by the United States|department of defense.

Al Qahtani|was never waterboarded?

No.

Now, were there some things done

that shouldn't have been done|at Guantanamo?

You bet.

When someone looked|like they were

a very high-value detainee,

the department of defense|didn't deal with them.

The central intelligence agency|did, and properly so.

In the case of Qahtani,

he was a high-value detainee,

and for some reason,|he wasn't transferred.

Someone junior|in the chain of command

decided that he was probably|the 20th hijacker.

General hill wrote a memo.

"There are three categories|of interrogation techniques

that we would like you|to consider for approval."

How unusual were|these techniques?

Oh, they ran the gamut.

One of the techniques|recommended was waterboarding,

which I rejected.

Others would be,|"yelling at the detainee,

techniques of deception,

where you'd use|multiple interrogator--

interviewer may identify himself

as a citizen of a foreign--

with a reputation|for harsh treatment--

category II techniques--

stress positions, like standing,

for a maximum of four hours.

Falsified documents|or reports--

the use of isolation|facility for up to 30 days.

Deprivation of light|and auditory stimuli.

Hood placed over his head

during transportation|and questioning.

20 hour interrogations.

Removal of all comfort items,|including religious items.

Removal of clothing. Forced|grooming, shaving of facial hair.

Detainee individual phobias,|such fear of dogs,

to induce stress.

Category III techniques.|Use of non--

physical contact such as|grabbing and light pushing."

I think that's all.

Good grief,|that's a pile of stuff.

Jim Haynes, the general counsel,

sent it to me with a cover memo.

"I recommend that you approve|most of the things

in category I, if not all,

most of the things|in category II, if not all,

and one or two or three|of the things in category III.

But disapprove the others."

I remember one of the things|required that

he'd stand for three or four,|five, six hours.

When I approved it,|I wrote down that, you know,

I stand for eight or ten|hours a day.

I forget what I said,|but something like that.

Needless to say,|I did not intend

that my memo would then be sent|back down the chain of command.

In the case of Qahtani,

some of the things|that were done to him

were not approved.

And the interrogation plan

involving the duration|and the combination

of the techniques|was not proper.

Up came a concern expressed|to the general counsel.

"We hear some of these things|are being done to this fellow

that aren't approved|or aren't proper

in the interrogation plan."

And he came in and told me,

and I immediately|rescinded that memo.

Some weeks later, we reissued

the enhanced|interrogation techniques.

There was criticism|from some of the military people

in the chain|that by suspending them

for a period of weeks,

we were putting at risk|the American people.

How do you know|when you're going too far?

You can't know with certainty.

All the easy decisions|are made down below.

When you say,|"how can you know?"

The answer is,|"you can't."

Wouldn't it be wonderful|if we could see around corners,

have our imaginations anticipate

every conceivable thing|that could happen and then,

from that full array|and spectrum,

pick out the ones|that will happen?

Is there any|evidence to indicate

that Iraq has attempted to|or is willing to supply

terrorists with weapons|of mass destruction?

As we know,|there are known knowns.

There are things|we know we know.

We also know|there are known unknowns.

That is to say,|we know there's some things

we do not know.

But there are also|unknown unknowns,

the ones we don't know|we don't know.

We just want to know,|are you aware of any evidence,

because that would increase|our level of belief

from faith to something|that would be...

- Yeah...|- Based on evidence.

"Subject: To discuss with P.,"

meaning the president|of the United States.

"The absence of evidence

is not evidence of absence."

When you say,|"the absence of evidence

is not evidence of absence,"|what you're saying

is that there is an absence|of evidence about something,

but you ought not to say|that therefore that is proof

that something doesn't exist.

It's an easy thing to go|from the first part of that

in the wrong direction and say,

"well, the absence of evidence|means it isn't there."

If an inspection team|goes in now

and finds nothing because

perhaps Iraq is very good|at hiding it

or perhaps they have nothing--

but you all are of the belief|that they have it--

if they find nothing, does it|make your job more difficult

in trying to assemble|an international coalition

to disarm him by other means?

Goodness gracious,|that is kind of like

looking down the road|for every conceivable pothole

you can find|and then driving into it.

I just don't--|I don't get up in the morning

and ask myself that.

The--

we know they have|weapons of mass destruction.

We know|they have active programs.

There isn't any debate about it.

It was thought to be|the best intelligence available.

How do you describe it

when it turns out|to be not accurate?

Do you describe that|as a failure of intelligence?

I suppose some can,|not unfairly, suggest that.

Saddam Hussein|may have been fearful

that he would be discovered|as having those weapons,

removed them or destroyed them,

but not wanted to tell anybody|that he'd done so.

He may have destroyed them,

unwilling to admit it,

fearful of being seen as weak.

Wouldn't it be strange|if he had destroyed his W.M.D.

And got invaded anyway?

Of course, I'm not suggesting|that that's the case.

I honestly do not know|what the case is.

All I know is that|the intelligence community

persuaded the president|and secretary Powell.

He spent days preparing himself|to make his presentation

to the united nations.

And he spent years|trying to explain

why he had done it.

It's a short sentence.

The reason he presented it|was 'cause he believed it.

"October 15, 2001.

Subject: Definition.

Please give me|a good definition for terrorism

and some elaboration as to|what it is and what it isn't."

"December 28, 2001.

Subject:|Adopting common terminology.

I suggest we use|the following terms.

'Afghan Taliban':

Afghan officials and fighters|of the former regime."

"October 31, 2002.

Subject:|Definition of victory.

Where is that definition|of victory?"

"January 6, 2003.

Subject: Terminology.

I want to make a list of things

I've done at the Pentagon,

like getting rid of words.

National missile defense,|requirements,

readiness--|ready for what?"

"October 1, 2003.

Subject: Please get me the|Oxford dictionary definition

of 'several'|and type it up for me.

Thanks."

"May 14, 2004.

Definition.

Please give me|the dictionary definition

of 'scapegoat.'

thanks."

And where did this term|"shock and awe" come from?

I don't know.

Apparently, general Franks|read it.

He used it.

It became|part of a press discussion.

But the idea of shock and awe?

I've told you all I know|about that phrase.

I picked up a newspaper today,

and I couldn't believe it.

I read eight headlines|that talked about chaos,

violence, unrest.

And it just was, "Henny Penny,

the sky is falling."

I've never seen|anything like it.

And here is a country|that's being liberated.

Here are people|who are going from being

repressed|and held under the thumb

of a vicious dictator,|and they're free,

and all this newspaper could do,

with 8 or 10 headlines--

they showed a man bleeding,

a civilian who they claimed|we had shot.

One thing after another,|it's just unbelievable

how people can take that away

from what is happening|in that country.

Stuff happens.

But in terms of what's going on|in that country,

it is a fundamental|misunderstanding

to see those images|over and over and over again

of some boy walking out|with a vase,

and saying, "oh, my goodness.

You didn't have a plan."

That's nonsense.

They know what they're doing,

and they're doing|a terrific job.

And it's untidy,|and freedom's untidy,

and free people|are free to make mistakes

and commit crimes|and do bad things.

They're also free|to live their lives

and do wonderful things.

And that's|what's gonna happen here.

Mr. secretary--

this was another violent|day in the streets of Baghdad.

One of Washington's|nightmares came true today.

The bush administration|is admitting it wasn't fully

prepared for the huge task|of governing post-war Iraq.

Now troops patrol these|streets knowing that to many,

they are not liberators,|but occupiers.

It's a situation|the Pentagon admits

it failed to anticipate.

The Pentagon is|scoffing at suggestions

that an organized guerrilla|resistance is forming.

"July 23, 2003."

To general John Abizaid.

"Subject: Definitions.

Attached are the definitions|of 'guerilla warfare,'

'insurgency,'|and 'unconventional warfare.'

they came from|the Pentagon dictionary.

Thanks."

It seemed to me|that there are ways

you can talk about|what the enemy's doing

that help the enemy|unintentionally

and ways you can talk about|what the enemy's doing

that harm the enemy,

that make his task|less legitimate,

more difficult.

What you're seeing is

Rumsfeld floundering around,|trying to figure out,

what do all those words mean?

What do other people think|they mean?

What are the best ones to use

that will benefit|the United States of America?

One of you suggested|I go to the dictionary.

I didn't ask this question.

Yes, but he would have.

I have since gone|to the dictionary,

and I have looked up|several things,

one of which I can't|immediately recapture,

but one was "guerrilla war."

Another was "insurgency."

Another was|"unconventional war."

Pardon me?

"Quagmire"?

No, that's someone|else's business.

Quagmire's the--|I don't do quagmires.

As I looked at the dictionary,

I'm not uncomfortable|with "unconventional,"

because it is not an army,|and it is not a Navy,

and it is not an air force.

But even there,|the dictionary--

the Pentagon dictionary--

I haven't looked|in a regular dictionary.

The Pentagon dictionary does not|even land that one perfectly

on what's taking place.

The bush administration has been

on a stepped-up P.R. Campaign

to stop the erosion|of support at home

for the dangerous mission|in Iraq.

Today, an unprecedented|series of bombings

left a trail|of death and devastation.

The concern|that Iraq's reconstruction is,

in fact, falling well short|of expectations.

Today in Fallujah,|Iraqi guerrillas

used a roadside bomb to bring|an American patrol to--

Briggs accused the Rumsfeld|team of being under-prepared

for post-war conditions|on the ground and unwilling

to share decision-making|with other government agencies.

Acknowledgement|that long-simmering tensions

over Iraq and its aftermath,|particularly between

the departments of state|and defense,

have now reached full boil.

October of 2003.

I became worried|that we were having trouble

measuring progress,

and I wrote a memo called|"global war on terror."

"Are we winning or losing|the global war on terror?

Is D.O.D. Changing|fast enough to deal

with the new 21st-century|security environment?

Are the changes we have|and are making too modest

and incremental?

My impression is that|we have not yet

made truly bold moves,

although we have made many|sensible, logical moves

in the right direction."

"But are they enough," I asked.

"Today we lack metrics to know

if we are winning or losing|the global war on terror.

Are we killing or deterring|more terrorists every day

than the madrassas|and the radical clerics

are recruiting and deploying|against us?

It's pretty clear|that the coalition can win

in Afghanistan and Iraq

in one way or another,

but it will be|a long, hard slog."

It was Christmastime.

I can recall going up|to the secure phone closet.

It's in the second floor|of our house,

not too far from my bedroom.

What was in there|was a noise system

that sounded like an ocean wave.

They had scooped up some people,

low-level people,

who might have some reason|to know where he might be.

He'd been moving|around the country every day,

sleeping a different place,

moving around in taxicabs.

Also moving around|were some body doubles,

people who looked|exactly like Saddam Hussein,

indeed, had the same|distinguishing marks

on their bodies.

Some low-level individual|said that he believed

he knew where|Saddam Hussein was.

They inspected this farm|out in the middle of nowhere.

There was a trapdoor.

They opened this up.

Lo and behold, here was|this bedraggled, bearded man

down in that hole.

Saddam Hussein clearly|concluded it was all a bluff.

The United States|was a paper tiger.

They weren't gonna do anything.

The first Gulf war|left him feeling

that no one|was gonna bother him.

He was the person who prevailed.

He obviously felt|that he was a survivor.

And he was, for a while.

Someone said, "do you want|to go see Saddam Hussein,"

after he was captured.

And I said,|"no."

I said, "I would like|to talk to Tariq Aziz."

It's a complicated situation|for me.

As the number two man,

simultaneously|deputy prime minister

and foreign minister|for Saddam Hussein,

and you meet with him,|you come away

with that he is a perfectly|rational, logical individual.

I've spent hours and hours|with him.

You wonder what goes on|in a mind like that.

I would love to talk|to Tariq Aziz and figure out

what in the world|they were thinking.

What else might|the United States have done

to reach out to them

and get them|to behave rationally.

On February 6, 2003,

to Jim Haynes.

"Subject: Detainees.

I am concerned|that the detainee issues

we were wrestling with|have not been resolved.

And as far as I can see...

...it has just|dropped into a black pit.

We have to get it figured out.|Thanks."

"January 10, 2003.

Subject: Detainees.

I have simply got to know

when you folks|are going to be prepared

to brief the White House|on detainees.

In fact, I don't think|I'll even do it that way.

Instead, let me just say,|you should be prepared

to brief the White House..."

"Subject: The N.S.C."

"Or the principals committee|on detainees,

including the most recent|issue that has been raised,

no later than next Tuesday."

"January 14.

I want to get briefed|on the Iraqi detainees fast.

I'm really worried about it.

Thanks."

When the pictures came,

it had an impact|that was well beyond

anything that I'd experienced.

Why do you think|the pictures did it?

What it showed was people|engaging in acts of abuse

that were disgusting|and revolting.

There were pictures|showing that prison guards

in the midnight shift

were doing things to prisoners|that didn't kill them,

that didn't create injuries|that were permanent,

but they were engaging|in sadistic things,

and there was nudity involved.

I knew that it would create|a advantage for the terrorists,

for Al-Qaeda and for the people|in the insurgency,

who were out recruiting.

They could show|that the Americans

were treating people badly.

It worked against everything|we were trying to do.

I walked in|and said to the president,

"I'm the senior person,|and I believe in accountability.

Here's my resignation."

It was in my handwriting.

I didn't want to dictate it

or have it typed up by somebody.

I felt a very strong sense

that something terrible|had happened on my watch.

He said, "don, I recognize|how you feel about this,

but that's not gonna|solve the problem."

I testified before the house,|testified before the senate,

tried to figure out|how everything happened.

When a ship runs aground,

the captain of the ship's|generally relieved.

You don't relieve|your presidents,

and I couldn't find anyone|that I thought

it would be fair and responsible|to pin the tail on.

So I sat down and wrote|a second letter of resignation,

and I still believe to this day

that I was correct|and it would have been better,

better for the administration|and the department of defense

and better for me,

if the department|could have started fresh

with someone else|in the leadership position.

So you wish|it had been accepted?

Yes.

There's a claim|that the interrogation rules

used in Guantanamo

migrated to Iraq,

where they led|to incredible abuse.

The evidence is to the contrary.

There were 12 investigations

that looked at these issues,

some by civilians,

distinguished people like|Dr. Harold brown

and Dr. James Schlesinger,|former secretaries of defense,

others by military officials.

To suggest that|the procedures from Guantanamo

migrated over to Iraq

is to suggest that|the procedures in Guantanamo

would have encouraged the kind

of unbelievably bad, illegal,|improper behavior

that took place at Abu Ghraib,

and there's nothing|that would have permitted

anything like that.

Anyone who reads|the investigative reports

knows that's not the case.

This is from|the Schlesinger report.

"Changes in D.O.D.|Interrogation policies

between December 2, 2002,|and April 16, 2003,

were an element contributing|to uncertainties in the field

as to which techniques|were authorized.

Although specifically limited|by the secretary of defense

to Guantanamo, and requiring|his personal approval,

given in only two cases,

the augmented techniques|for Guantanamo

migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq

where they were neither limited|nor safeguarded."

Mm-hmm.

Yeah, I think|that's a fair assessment.

Mm-hmm.

Are you saying|stuff just happens?

Well, we know that

in every war|there are things that evolve

that hadn't been planned for|or fully anticipated

and that things occur|which shouldn't occur.

Wouldn't it have been|better not to go there at all?

Well, I guess time will tell.

Barack Obama opposed|most of the structures

that president George W. Bush|put in place:

Guantanamo bay, the concept|of indefinite detention,

the patriot act,|military commissions.

Here we are, years later,

and they're all still there.

I think that kind of has to|validate, to some extent,

the decisions that were made|by president George W. Bush.

We went to Bethesda|and Walter Reed

a great many times.

The strength that you felt|from the families

and the people wounded

was just absolutely|an inspiration.

It was an intensive care unit.

The doctor said,|"this guy's not gonna make it."

We walked in, met the man,|talked to him,

talked to the family.

I don't know what the word is.

But the family--|the wife said,

"I know he'll make it."

I think it was probably|two, three, four weeks later

I went back, and sure as heck,

the doctor said he made it.

Unbelievable.

So we're|a very fortunate country,

and the good lord willing,

we won't have|to be engaged in wars,

but I'm afraid,|human nature being what it is,

that we'll have to continue|to ask young men and women

to come and serve our country,

and their lives will be at risk.

When you're in a position|like secretary of defense,

do you feel that you actually|are in control of history

or that history|is controlling you?

Oh, neither.

Obviously,|you don't control history,

and you are failing|if history controls you.

Are you surprised|when you go back

and read these memos?

Oh, my goodness, yes.

I can't believe|some of the things I wrote.

I don't know where|all those words came from.

"February 4, 2004.

Subject: What you know.

There are knowns knowns.

There are known unknowns.

There are unknown unknowns.

But there are also|unknown knowns.

That is to say,|things that you think you know

that it turns out|you did not."

If you take those words

and try to connect them|in each way that is possible...

There was at least|one more combination

that wasn't there:

The unknown knowns.

Things that|you possibly may know

that you don't know you know.

But the memo doesn't say that.

It says we know less,|not more, than we think we do.

Is that right?|I reversed it?

Put it up again.|Let me see.

"There are also unknown knowns.

That is to say,|things that you think you know

that it turns out you did not."

Yeah, I think that memo|is backwards.

I think that it's closer|to what I said here than that.

Unknown knowns.

I think you're probably, Errol,|chasing the wrong rabbit here.

As ubiquitous|as those suicide bombers

have become in Iraq, far more|people are now being killed

by executions|than by those bombings.

Another 40 bodies today dumped

on the streets of Baghdad,|tortured.

But with|an especially deadly October

and Iraq tipping toward chaos--

the U.S. is on|the brink of failure in Iraq.

A parade of generals called|Rumsfeld’s war strategy flawed.

The democrats are in;|Donald Rumsfeld is out.

Firing secretary of|defense Donald Rumsfeld

and replacing him with a veteran|of his father's administration.

Mr. President,|thank you for your kind words.

The great respect that I have|for your leadership

in this little-understood,|unfamiliar war,

the first war|of the 21st century.

It is not well known.

It was not well understood.

It is complex for people|to comprehend.

And I know with certainty|that, over time,

the contributions you've made|will be recorded by history.

Thank you.

Mr. secretary.

This way.

"December 15, 2006.

To: Pentagon personnel.

From: Donald Rumsfeld.

Subject: 'Snowflakes--

the blizzard is over.'

over the past six years,

thousands of these memos|have fallen,

sometimes in blizzards,

and sometimes in cold|and lonely isolation.

Yet, as surprising|as this may seem

to those who may have been|buried in the deluge,

there are many people|in the department

who have never received|a snowflake.

This snowflake|is especially for them.

Its message is, perhaps|typically, to the point.

Thank you.

The blizzard is over."

One last question.

Why are you doing this?

Why are you talking to me?

That is a vicious question.

I'll be darned if I know.

THE END

The Unkown known (2013) - 2nd part

I used to tease him and say

I hoped he appreciated fully|how I handled his departure

from the hotel in San Francisco.

No one ever noticed

that he had the neon sign|on his forehead.

"Mr. President,|I care a great deal

about you as a person|and about your success.

I care deeply about the country

and believe|it is vitally important

that you be re-elected.

The morale is low|in the White House

because of the organizational|approach you have tolerated.

The job you need done|cannot be done

unless major changes|take place."

Dick Cheney and I|both attached our resignations

to the memo.

There wasn't anything|in the memo

I hadn't talked to him about|four, five, six times.

I decided that putting it down|in one place,

deciding to resign,

causing him to register|how strongly we felt about it.

He ended up separating|the positions

of secretary of state|and national security advisor,

which Henry had held|both of them.

And he made|several other changes.

Put George Herbert Walker bush

in the central|intelligence agency.

He wanted to make a change|at the Pentagon,

asked me to become|secretary of defense,

then my deputy, Dick Cheney,|to become chief of staff.

Of course, this becomes|known as the Halloween massacre.

Oh.

I guess it is.

You know, a narrative|gets built out there

over a period of time.

Big personalities|going at each other.

In fact,|it's perfectly understandable.

They represent|different institutions,

and they have|different perspectives.

But it gets written up|in the media

as though it's jealousies|and personalities

and that type of thing|as opposed to

different perspectives.

When Shakespeare wrote history,

it was all character defects,|jealousies,

misunderstandings,

et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

In Shakespeare,|it's the motivating force

of history.

Maybe Shakespeare got it wrong.

Well, you know,|it was a different time.

He was dealing|with different issues.

Maybe he had it right.

Maybe it just was different|later.

Nelson Rockefeller has taken|himself out of consideration

as a vice presidential candidate

on president Ford's ticket|next year.

Rockefeller has|little choice in the matter.

Rumsfeld's calculated plan|to pave his own way

as a running mate|for president Ford.

Donald Rumsfeld has|been mentioned for months

as a possible vice presidential|running mate with president Ford.

...in congress think|his new job

as defense secretary is a means

of putting Rumsfeld|in the running

for the vice presidency.

Donald Rumsfeld|takes over the Pentagon

but also keeps most|of his personal influence

with president Ford.

...the shake-up|took place.

The consensus is that Rumsfeld

again emerged the winner.

Rumsfeld's|conservative influence

at the White House|will be carried on

by 34-year-old|Richard Cheney,

who said in his office|this afternoon,

he'll be running things|just like don did.

In November 1975...

I became the youngest secretary|of defense in history.

It's important, I suppose,

to go back|and set the background

for this occasion.

Henry Kissinger had the job

of fostering Detentes,

a lessening of tension|with the Soviet Union.

The more talk there was|about Detentes

and the more|these negotiations went on

and the more people sat around|clinking champagne glasses

with great big smiles,

and the world saw all of that,

the congress|and the American people

would not be in favor of|increasing defense investment.

It was really fundamental|differences of approach.

Weakness, historically,|tends to prove to be provocative

and create instabilities|in wars and conflicts.

Strength on our part|will contribute

to peace and stability|in the world.

I'm not saying with certainty

that the Russians are coming.

I'm saying the trends are here.

I'm not saying|the Russians are 10 feet tall.

I'm saying they used to be 5'3".

They're now 5'9 1/2",

and they're growing,|and we're not.

To be brand-new|in the department of defense

with a presidential campaign|going on,

my task was to meet with members|of the United States congress.

Small, intimate setting|where I could take

a classified briefing

and show them|the overhead photographs

that were highly classified,|that were top secret,

let them see for themselves|what the Soviet Union was doing.

I would get 6 or 8 or 10 of them

and bring them down|to the Roosevelt room,

which is right|across from the oval office

in the west wing|of the White House.

Not in the Pentagon;|In the White House.

In the White House, absolutely.

If you have a meeting|in the White House

in the Roosevelt room,

and the president stops by

and says hello to 'em,

it is much more memorable|for them.

I had a major fraction of|all the United States senators

and all the members|of the congress

come in to those meetings,

you know, night after|night after night.

When you would show|these photographs to people

from satellites|or from a u-2,

people were amazed by them.

In addition, we prepared a|unclassified series of charts.

One was on U.S./U.S.S.R.|Military manpower.

Another one had U.S. and Soviet|military investment...

Intercontinental|ballistic missile developments...

Changes in|strategic force levels...

Warheads, megatonnage,

estimated production rates.

No one statistic|was determinative.

What was important is,|what were the trend lines?

Did it come as a surprise|that Carter beat Ford in 1976?

He started out way behind.

If it had gone on|another week or two,

he might very well have won.

The republican|national convention

begins here tomorrow, and most|of the players are in place.

Everybody's playing the|vice presidential guessing game.

One big question remains.

Who will be Reagan's|vice presidential choice?

The Republicans are|floating some of the rumors

in an effort to keep--

the list includes former|ambassador George Bush,

who gave Reagan his|toughest primary battle,

or the defense secretary,|Donald Rumsfeld.

The questions about|Rumsfeld are whether his ties

to republican big business are too close

and whether he's too ambitious|to fit in

playing second fiddle to Reagan.

There is the picture|of Donald Rumsfeld

as Machiavelli,|and that you managed

George H.W. Bush|into the CIA

as a way of destroying|his presidential ambitions.

It's utter nonsense.

He had to know the truth.

And why he would|promote that idea--

he must have believed it|for some reason.

I suppose it's kind of|more fun for somebody

to be able to say|they were pushed,

rather than they tripped.

Reagan was up a floor above.

I was with my wife, Joyce.

I had a man glued at my hip,

ready to tell me|if governor Reagan called

and wanted me|to be vice president.

The press was filled|with this excitement

about the possibility|of president Reagan

selecting Gerald R. Ford.

I was stunned at the thought.

It's like sticking four hands|on the steering wheel.

You're gonna end up|putting the truck in the ditch.

My phone rang.

It was governor Reagan.

He said, "don,

I want you to know|that I've decided to have

George Bush be|my vice presidential nominee."

I said, "fantastic.

I am so relieved

that you decided|not to have Gerald Ford."

He said, "oh, no, don.

Jerry and I decided together

that it wouldn't be|a good idea."

It seems to me|that if that decision

had gone|a slightly different way,

you would have been|vice president

and future president|of the United States.

That's possible.

I was living in Illinois

and was chief executive officer|of a pharmaceutical company,

G.D. Searle and co.

In a barracks in Beirut,

a truck loaded with explosives

came racing through the gate,|under the building.

Killed 241 Americans.

Shortly after,|the secretary of state,

George Shultz, called and said

that they wanted me to serve

as special envoy|for president Reagan

to the Middle East.

...with our new representative.

So, don, good luck,|and our hearts are with you.

Mr. President--

I began traveling in the region.

I would send cables back

trying to report back|on my observations.

I entitled one of them,|back in November of 1983,

"the swamp."

"I suspect we ought|to lighten our hand

in the Middle East.

We should move the framework|away from the current situation

where everyone is telling us|everything is our fault

and angry with us

to a basis where|they are seeking our help.

In the future,|we should never use U.S. troops

as a peacekeeping force.

We're too big a target.

Let the Fijians|or New Zealanders do that.

And keep reminding ourselves

that it is easier|to get into something

than it is to get out of it.

I promise you,

you will never hear|out of my mouth the phrase,

'the U.S. seeks|a just and lasting peace

in the Middle East.'

there is little that is just,

and the only things I've seen|that are lasting

are conflict, blackmail,|and killing."

We arrived at night,|as I recall.

The building where|Saddam Hussein had his office

had sandbags all around it

because Baghdad is so close

to the Iranian border.

And they were at war with Iran,

and they were being shelled|from time to time.

We went into this building,|got in an elevator,

went up,|got out of the elevator,

and the three or four people|I was with

were walking along.

All of a sudden,|an Iraqi cut me off

and took me down a corridor,|a dark corridor.

Oh, yeah, I don't know,|20 paces, 30 paces.

And then into a room.

And I was alone in the room,

and I looked up,|and here is this man

in fatigues|with a pistol on his hip.

And it turned out|to be Tariq Aziz,

the deputy prime minister|and foreign minister.

It was hours that we were|in there talking alone.

It looked like|it had leather walls,

padded walls,

maybe Naugahyde or something.

We would have a meeting|with Saddam Hussein

the next morning,|and the time was set.

And we went in,|and there he was.

A brutal dictator|in his military fatigues

with his pistol at his hip.

It was just a preliminary step,

and it became almost iconic...

...my shaking hands|with this brutal dictator

who later became known as|"the butcher of Baghdad."

He postured constantly

and was presenting himself|as the great leader,

which dictators apparently do.

They foster that,|and have schoolkids praise them,

make sure that their image|is everywhere,

whether in a photograph|or a statue,

and cause people|to bow and kowtow.

And, you know, if you see|your picture everywhere

long enough,|and if you see enough statues,

pretty soon you might even|begin to believe that.

He almost became|a caricature of himself,

by my standards, as an outsider|not prone to worship idols.

He was living|his image of himself,

which was pretend.

There are those|who suggest today

that the United States|is in decline,

that, in fact, we should allow

someone else to contribute|to the stability in the world.

I happen to disagree with that,

and I think that we need|to provide leadership,

and I think that leadership|can make an enormous difference

in what the world's gonna look like|in the 1990s and the year 2000.

If you read the newspapers|or watch television today,

and you look at the polls,

first they rank Gorbachev

as the reason that|these changes are occurring,

and second,|they gave Reagan some credit,

which is ridiculous.

The credit belongs|to Truman and Adenauer

and to steadfastness|over a period of 40 years.

The credit goes|to the investments

of billions of dollars

over a long, sustained|period of time

by people who were carped at|and criticized

and said, "oh, my goodness,|you're warmongers."

It went to the concept|of peace through strength.

And we need to understand|how we got to where we are,

because going forward, we're|gonna have to make a judgment

as to what role|our country ought to play,

and a passive role|would be terribly dangerous.

But who do we want to lead--

provide leadership in the world?

Somebody else?

We're here today|to swear in don Rumsfeld

as secretary of defense|and welcome him back

to the public service.

We were colleagues in government|for nearly six years,

and here, quite simply, is a|man who's been an executive,

a statesman, and a human being|of the first order.

I assume that Dick Cheney|brought you

into the bush administration.

I would assume that's the case.

I don't think George W. Bush's|father recommended it.

Obviously, George W. Bush|was his own man,

made his own decisions.

"Subject: Chain of command."

A memo to Condoleezza Rice.

"Because I've failed|to get you and the N.S.C. Staff

to stop giving tasks|to combatant commanders

and the joint staff,

I've drafted|the attached memorandum.

I'd hoped it would|not be necessary

for me to do it this way,

but since your last memo stated

that we should work it out|from our end,

I'm forced to do so.

You are making a mistake.

You're not in|the chain of command.

Since you cannot seem|to accept that fact,

my only choices|are to go to the president

and ask him to tell you to stop

or to tell anyone|in the department of defense

not to respond to you

or the national|security council staff.

I've decided|to take the latter course.

If it fails, I'll have to go|to the president.

One way or other, it will stop,

while I am secretary of defense.

Thanks."

Waging a high-profile war

has thrust Donald Rumsfeld|into the public eye.

Two months into|the war against terror--

Rumsfeld, who has|become the voice of the war.

80% public approval.

Give and take|with the Pentagon press corps

is now must-see television.

Greetings.

Good morning.

Good afternoon.

You know, something's|neither good nor bad

but thinking makes it so,|I suppose.

Yes, you may ask that...

But will I answer that?|No.

I do not want the record to show

that I even bothered|to deny it, however.

So I've decided that|I'm not gonna go asking

for an unclassified|piece of paper.

I don't need it.|You need it.

So you get told things|every day that don't happen.

It doesn't seem|to bother people.

But I'm working my way|over to figuring out

how I won't answer that.

We'll make this|the last question.

Last question.

Mr. secretary, could I just|ask one thing about Gitmo?

Oh, no, no, I love that ending.

I'm--uh--

if you think I'm gonna mess|that one up, you're wrong.

The U.S. and its Afghan|allies clearly have the momentum

in the battle for Tora Bora.

Secretary Rumsfeld admitted|it is unclear

when this fight will end.

The number of|prisoners is climbing.

Two weeks ago,|secretary Rumsfeld dismissed

the idea of detaining|large numbers

of captured fighters.

Well, this week,|he reversed himself,

saying a large number would|likely be taken into custody.

"January 19, 2002."

The subject:

"Status of Taliban|and Al-Qaeda."

"The United States|has determined

that Al-Qaeda and Taliban|individuals

under the control|of the department of defense,

are not entitled|to prisoner of war status

for purposes of the Geneva|conventions of 1949."

Don't you think|that the decision on Geneva

caused so much trouble?

Oh, my goodness, it would|have been so much easier

if you could treat people,|all of them,

the same as prisoners of war.

Then you wouldn't have|to interrogate anybody.

You could just house them|someplace.

Now, would that have been|a responsible thing

for the president|to do? No.

The president needed to know|what was gonna happen next.

Every day,|the intelligence reports said,

"this is a risk.|This is a risk.

Watch out for this.|Something could happen there."

It was the responsibility of the president|to try to prevent a future attack.

Tell you what I'm gonna do.

I am gonna stay here

and answer as many|detainee questions

as need to be answered.

I don't know|that I'll know the answers

to all the questions,|but I--

if I don't, we'll find them,

because it seems to me|it's time to tap down

some of this hyperbole|that we're finding.

Mr. secretary--|Mr. secretary--

- Mr. secretary--|- Mr. secretary.

Is John Walker being treated|the same way

- as the other detainees?|- Yes.

Shackled,|hooded in the transfer--

oh, my goodness.|Now, look.

The Unknown Known 2013 - 1st part

The Unknown Known 2013 - 1st part

Let me put up this next memo.
You want me to read this?
Yes, please.
"February 4, 2004.
Subject: What you know.
There are known knowns.
There are known unknowns.
There are unknown unknowns.
But there are also|unknown knowns.
That is to say,|things that you think you know
that it turns out|you did not."
I wonder if in the future
public figures will write|as many memos as I did.
I doubt it.
I must have gotten|in the habit of dictating
things that were important.
Not a diary.
Not a journal.
They're almost all|working documents.
Now, they've become historical|documents in retrospect,
but at the time,|they all had a purpose.
In the later years|of my using the dictaphone,
why, they were called|snowflakes,
because they were|on white paper.
What would you say|the total number of memos
might be?
They said I dictated 20,000
just in the last six years|at the Pentagon.
There have to be millions.
"July 27, 2001."
A memo to Condoleezza Rice|concerning Iraq.
"We have discussed Iraq|on a number of occasions.
The discussions|have been inconclusive.
Sanctions are being limited
in a way that cannot weaken|Saddam Hussein.
We can publicly acknowledge|that the sanctions don't work
over extended periods|and stop the pretense
of having a policy|that is keeping Saddam
'in the box'|when we know he has crawled
a good distance out of the box.
Within a few years,
the U.S. will undoubtedly|have to confront
a Saddam armed|with nuclear weapons.
If Saddam's regime|were oustered,
we would have|a much-improved position
in the region|and elsewhere."
Why the obsession|with Iraq and Saddam?
Well, you love that word,|"obsession."
I can see the glow|in your face when you say it.
Well, I'm an obsessive person.
Are you? I'm not.
I'm--|I'm cool.
I'm measured.
If you look|at the range of my memos,
there might be 1/10 of 1%|about Iraq.
The reason I was concerned|about Iraq
is 'cause four-star generals|would come to me and say,
"Mr. secretary,|we have a problem.
Our orders are to fly over|the northern part of Iraq
and the Southern part of Iraq|on a daily basis,
with the Brits,|and we are getting shot at.
At some moment--|could be tomorrow,
could be next month,|could be next year--
one of our planes|is gonna be shot down
and our pilots and crews|are gonna be killed
or they're gonna be|captured."
The question will be,
"what in the world were|we flying those flights for?
What was|the cost-benefit ratio?
What was our country gaining?"
So you sit down and you say,
"I think I'm gonna see
if I can get|the president's attention.
Remind him that our planes|are being shot at,
remind him that we don't have|a fresh policy for Iraq,
and remind him that we've got|a whole range of options."
Not an obsession.
A very measured,|nuanced approach,
I think.
In my confirmation hearing
when I was nominated|to be secretary of defense,
the best question|I was asked was,
"what do you worry about|when you go to bed at night?"
And my answer was, in effect,
"intelligence.
The danger|that we can be surprised
because of|a failure of imagining
what might happen|in the world."
There are known knowns,|the things we know we know.
There are known unknowns,
the things we know|we don't know.
There are also|that third category
of unknown unknowns,
the things we don't know|we don't know.
And you can only know more|about those things
by imagining what they might be.
Pearl harbor was|a failure of imagination.
We didn't know we didn't know
that they could do what they|did the way they did it.
We had people working|on breaking codes.
We had people thinking through,
"what are the kinds of things|they might do?"
And lo and behold,|the carriers were able to,
on a Sunday morning,|get very close to Hawaii,
launch their planes, and|impose enormous destruction.
Was it failure of imagination
or failure to look|at the intelligence
that was available?
They had thought through
a great many|more obvious possibilities.
People were chasing|the wrong rabbit.
That one possibility|was not something
that they had imagined|was likely.
"July 23, 2001.
Subject:|'Pearl harbor post-mortem.'
in some future hearing,
I am going to say|that I do not want
to be sitting before this panel
in a modern-day version|of a pearl harbor post-mortem:
Who didn't do what,|when, where, and why.
None of us would want|to have to be back here
going through that agony."
A month or so before|September 11, 2001,
it would be wrong to think|that someone who wrote it--
namely me, was prescient.
I wasn't.
I simply had read enough history
that I worried.
American 11, climb,
maintain flight level 350.
American 11, climb,|maintain flight level 350.
American 11, Boston.
The American on the frequency,|how do you hear me?
American 11,|if you hear Boston center
re-contact Boston center|on 127.82.
That's American 11, 127.82.
My military assistant,
admiral Ed Giambastiani,|came in and said,
"a plane has hit|the world trade center."
It was assumed|to be an accident.
And I went into my office|from the conference room,
and admiral Giambastiani said,|"another plane has hit
the other world|trade center tower."
And of course, at that point,
it wasn't an accident;|It was an attack.
Within minutes,|I felt the Pentagon shake.
That's how our day began|on September 11th.
They had hit the center|of economic power in New York,
and they then had hit|the center of military power
at the Pentagon.
You need to find out|what had happened.
What was it?
I got up and|went down the hall, and--
on my floor,|until the smoke was so bad
I had to get outside.
Then I went downstairs and|outside and around the corner,
and here were pieces of|that American airlines airplane
just spread all over the apron,|all over the grass.
Flames and smoke,
people being brought out|of the building
who were injured|and burned and wounded.
The first responders|really hadn't arrived yet.
There were|very few people there.
How do you think|that they got away with 9/11?
It seems amazing in retrospect.
Everything seems amazing|in retrospect.
Pearl harbor seems amazing|in retrospect.
It's a failure of imagination.
It's not as though you aren't|aware of possibilities,
but you tend to favor|some possibilities
more than others.
And it's enormously important|to have priorities.
What are you gonna worry about?
What is it you want to do?
What are you gonna|be prepared for?
And you have to pick and choose.
Well, to the extent|you pick and choose
and you're wrong...
...the penalty can be enormous.
"September 30, 2001."
Memorandum.|Title: "Strategic thoughts."
"The U.S. strategic theme|should be aiding local peoples
to rid themselves of terrorists
and to free themselves|of regimes
that support terrorism.
The regimes of such states|should see that it will be fatal
to host terrorists|who attack the United States.
The United States government|should envision
a goal along these lines.
New regimes in Afghanistan|and another key state or two
that supports terrorism.
Syria out of Lebanon.
Dismantlement or destruction
of weapons of mass destruction|capabilities.
If the war does not|significantly change
the world's political map,
the U.S. will not|achieve its aim."
On my orders,|the United States military
has begun strikes
against Al-Qaeda|terrorist training camps
and military installations
of the Taliban regime|in Afghanistan.
In relatively short order,|a matter of weeks,
Kabul was occupied,
the Taliban was defeated
and run out of the country|in large measure,
and a lot of Al-Qaeda|were killed.
Osama Bin Laden escaped|into Pakistan eventually.
The target of the|largest manhunt in history
still eludes capture.
Cave by cave, for any sign
of Osama Bin Laden,|dead or alive.
The high probability that|Osama Bin Laden is still alive.
With Afghanistan's|porous borders,
it's possible Bin Laden|has already slipped
out of the country.
Osama gets away,|and a confusion sets in.
People began to think|that Saddam was connected
with Al-Qaeda and with 9/11.
Oh, I don't think so.
It was very clear that|the direct planning for 9/11
was done by|Osama Bin Laden's people,
Al-Qaeda,|and in Afghanistan.
I don't think|the American people
were confused about that.
In 2003,|in a Washington Post poll,
69% said they believe|it is likely
the Iraqi leader|was personally involved
in the attacks|carried out by Al-Qaeda.
I don't remember anyone|in the bush administration
saying anything like that,
nor do I recall|anyone believing that.
Mr. secretary, today|in a broadcast interview was--
Saddam Hussein said,|"there is only one truth.
Iraq has no weapons|of mass destruction whatsoever."
And he went on to say,
"I would like to tell you|directly
we have no relationship|with Al-Qaeda."
And Abraham Lincoln was short.
Would you care|to respond directly
to what Saddam Hussein|has said today?
I--
how does one respond to that?
It's just a continuous pattern.
This is a case of the local liar|coming up again
and people repeating|what he said
and forgetting to say|that he never--
almost never--|rarely tells the truth.
There are two sides to the coin.
One is,
"belief in the inevitability|of conflict
can become one|of its main causes."
That is a truth.
The other side of the coin,|which is also true, is,
"if you wish for peace,|prepare for war."
But if both were true,
well, you can use that|to justify anything.
There's a similar thing|in Rumsfeld’s rules
where I say,
"all generalizations are false,
including this one."
There it is.
The president did|harden his stand towards--
the United States|is on the road to war.
Administration|officials say the effort
to pressure Iraq has moved|into a final phase.
All the military pieces|should be in place
to go to war with Iraq.
On January 11, 2003,
the vice president's office|called
and requested that I come over|to meet with him
and the Saudi ambassador,|prince Bandar.
It was unusual.|I mean, I--
I wasn't often|in the vice president's office.
We sat down.
Dick proceeded to tell Bandar
that the president|was going to invade Iraq
and change the regime in Iraq.
That was the first time|that I'd heard anything
that sounded truly definitive.
What was the Saudi|ambassador's reaction to this?
He wanted reassurance|that when it was all over,
Saddam Hussein would be gone.
They needed to know|that the president was serious.
That is why, I'm sure,
the vice president said it|the way he said it.
Is it at all strange|that you would hear about it
in this way?
No.
No, I don't think so.
If the purpose of the war|is to get rid of Saddam Hussein,
why can't they just|assassinate him?
Why do you have|to invade his country?
Who's "they?"
Us.
You said, "they."
You didn't say, "we."
Well, "we."
I will rephrase it.
Why do we have to do that?
We don't assassinate|leaders of other countries.
Well, Dora Farms,|we were doing our best.
That was an act of war.
The beginning of the war,
even before it started,
George tenet came to see me|in my office at the Pentagon.
He said, "we think we know|where Saddam Hussein is."
I said, "terrific,"|and I called the White House
and said to the president,|"we're coming over."
We met in his office.
George tenet would go|from the oval office
in to a side office|and talk to the people
in the central|intelligence agency
who were talking to the agents|on the ground in Iraq.
The word came back
that somebody had identified|Saddam Hussein
as being at Dora Farms.
George tenet was convinced|that his people on the ground
were giving him|the straight dope.
They were certain he was there.
We'd put on alert aircraft.
The aircraft took off|and went to that location.
The president|went around the room asking,
"should we do this|or not?"
Everyone in the room,|as I recall,
agreed it was|sufficiently solid intelligence,
sufficient to do it.
We just were so hopeful
that by killing Saddam Hussein,
we could end the need for a war,
that in fact, by that act,|you would change the regime.
The planes went in,|and they struck the farm...
...killed some people.
They came out|with a stretcher with a body.
People there|on the ground asserted
that it was Saddam Hussein.
They think they killed him.
And it turned out, it was not.
What a wonderful|thing it would have been
if he could have been killed.
The war would have been avoided.
It's possible.
May not have been,
but it's possible.
You wonder why|they didn't respond
to all the efforts|that were made
to avoid that war.
How could they be that mixed up
in what the inevitable|next steps would be?
Why they wouldn't sit down
and have|an agonizing reappraisal,
and it come to some|logical conclusion?
I was elected to congress.
I was 30 years old.
It was during the Vietnam war|and the civil rights era.
There were big issues before us.
I would come back sometimes
knowing I didn't know|if I voted right,
that there are arguments here|and there were arguments there.
"Ugh, I hope I voted|the right way.
Why did I do what I did?"
And I'd sit down|and dictate that.
After almost every vote,|every amendment,
I would go back|with my little dictaphone.
I would dictate a note and say,
"here was the vote.
The ayes were this.|The nays were that.
Here were the amendments,|and here's what I did
and why I did it."
And then when I went|in the executive branch,
I would want to clarify|my own thinking,
so I would try to put it down|on paper and edit it,
and I'd go through|three, four, five drafts,
getting it the way|I really wanted it.
I would do it|for communications to my staff.
I wanted them to know|what I was thinking.
Did you imagine|that they would produce
this vast archive?
Oh, it never crossed my mind.
I never knew|what I was gonna do next.
The only thing I've ever|volunteered for in my life--
one was to go in the Navy,
and the other was|to run for congress.
The other was to get married.
You look at being|married to the same woman
all those decades--
when you're 20, 21, 22,
what did you know?
Both of us were young|and unformed.
How in the world|can you be that lucky?
How did you propose?
Imperfectly.
I was getting ready|to leave for Pensacola.
About 10:00 in the morning,|I said to my folks,
"I'll be back.
I'm gonna go down|and see Joyce."
I asked her to marry me.
I didn't get down on my knees.
I didn't do anything fancy.
I didn't want to get married,
but I sure as heck|didn't want her
to marry anyone else.
And I was correct.
It was a good decision.
It just hadn't been|part of my plan.
Director of the|office of economic opportunity
was Rumsfeld’s first job|for Richard Nixon.
Later, when O.E.O. Seemed|headed for extinction,
Mr. Nixon named him director|of the cost of living council.
After friction developed
between Rumsfeld|and H.R. Haldeman,
Rumsfeld requested a change
and was sent to Brussels|as the U.S. ambassador
to the north Atlantic|treaty organization.
He got out just in time
and survived Watergate|with reputation intact.
A person who works|that hard to become president
had to believe that|everything he did or thought
would be useful to preserve.
He puts in place|these recording devices,
like other presidents had,
and then he'd go about|being himself,
and sometimes|he'd let his hair down
and say things in ways|that he might not have said
had he remembered|that each second of the day
that it was being recorded.
All of us say things|we shouldn't say,
that on reflection,|we wish we hadn't said.
I expect he just felt that|on balance,
everything was worth preserving
because he was|an historic figure.
Did presidents after|Nixon make recordings
in the White House?
The only president|I was close enough to
to answer that question about|was Gerald R. Ford,
and I can assure you he did not.
My guess is that people|tend not to fall
in exactly the same potholes
that their predecessors do.
More often than not,|they make original mistakes.
We all do.
But I assume the presidency|under extraordinary...
Gerald Ford had announced,|when he first took office,
that he was not gonna have|a chief of staff.
He was going to be|the anti-Nixon,
the anti-Haldeman,|the anti-Ehrlichman.
He had said he was|gonna have a coordinator
or something like that.
And that's when I told him
he'd have to find somebody else,
because it wasn't gonna work,
and I didn't want|to be a party to it.
After a while,|he agreed that I was right.
At the time,|there were a number of people
still being looked at|by what was then called,
"the special prosecutor."
This is really|an extraordinary moment.
The White House is filled|with lawyers and investigators.
That's exactly right.
It was September 29, 1974,
in the morning|that I dictated this memo
on the subject of the safe|in the chief of staff's office.
"I arrived|at approximately 5:00 P.M.
I wanted to clean out the|place so that I could move in,
and I wanted to make sure that|there was nothing in the place
that I didn't want there,
such as recording equipment,|telephone bugs, and the like.
At approximately 5:15 P.M.,
bill Walker commented|that there was a safe
in the cupboard."
This says, "to the left|of the fireplace."
If you're standing|in the fireplace,
it was to the left.
Actually, it was to the right
if you faced the fireplace.
So here's a safe,|and it's locked.
And I thought, "oh, my goodness.
I wonder|what's in that safe?"
I said to Dick Cheney,
my assistant who was helping me,
"look, why don't we get|the secret service,
get 'em down here with people|who can move the safe
and open it|or do whatever they have to do."
And what happened|to the safe in the end?
The end for me was when|I got it out of my office
under a proper|chain of evidence.
♪ I'm dreaming ♪
♪ of a white Christmas ♪
♪ just like the ones ♪
♪ I used to know ♪
♪ where the treetops glisten ♪
♪ and children listen ♪
They put the word out,
"stay tuned|to armed forces radio.
When you hear it said
that the temperature is rising|to 105 degrees
and you hear, 'I'm dreaming|of a white Christmas,'
you'll know|the evacuation is ordered."
The north Vietnamese|and Viet Cong forces
moved into Saigon
directly towards|the U.S. facilities.
The scenes of the helicopter
lifting people off|of the roof of the building
were really heartbreaking,
because you had|really wonderful people
who'd worked with our forces
and knew that their circumstance
when the Vietcong|and north Vietnamese
took over that country|would be difficult,
that they'd be killed|or put in jail.
They kept lifting|more and more out,
and more kept coming.
They ended up landing|so many helicopters
on the carrier that they|started shoving helicopters off
so that they could get|more helicopters on.
Were you with the president|when all of this was going down?
Yes, I was in the oval office
with secretary Kissinger|and the president
and other close aides|to the president.
It was a day anyone involved|will never forget.
The inevitable ugly ending|of an unsuccessful effort.
Do you think that there's|a lesson to be taken from this?
Well, one would hope|that most things
that happen in life|prove to be lessons.
Some things work out.
Some things don't.|That didn't.
If that's a lesson--|yes, it's a lesson.
President Gerald Ford|had given a talk
to a labor group.
He went out the back,
and we went into|a freight elevator.
The doors went open,
we walked out,
and the top door came back down,
and it hit Gerald Ford|right across the forehead.
And he ended up with a cut|about an inch and a half wide.
Of course, at that moment,|Chevy chase and these people
were talking about Ford|bumping his head
or stumbling.
So we went up in the room|and the doctor started
putting powder on it|to see if he could calm it down
so it didn't look like|a neon sign.
It came time to leave.
He waved and shook hands.
Got out to the street corner...
A shot rang out.
Sara Jane Moore|was across the street,
fired a bullet.
It went by his head,
by the secret service|guy's head,
by my head.
A matter of inches|from both of us.
We got in the car,
pushed him down|on the floor, and...
Secret service man on top,|I'm on top.
The car races out of the city...
...not knowing|what might be next.
Finally you hear|this muffled thing
from president Ford,|and he says,
"come on, you guys.
Get off.|You're heavy."
And so we sat up,
went to the airplane, and left.